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 1 
Summary 
 
This thesis illustrates the increasing legal effects on copyright by the 
modern digital environment. In particular, the principle of copyright 
exhaustion, the exception to an author’s exclusive right to distribute his or 
her work, has been targeted with a novel interpretation. The principle 
ensures that when a right holder puts his/her copyrighted work on the 
market for sale, the distribution right is exhausted, meaning that the copy 
can no longer be controlled by the author. Traditionally, no application of 
exhaustion has been possible on intangible works since the principle has 
been regarded to only cover physical copies which are sold and not licensed.  
  
However, with the recent case of UsedSoft, the CJEU has ruled that the 
principle of exhaustion can apply on computer programs, or software. The 
CJEU held that if license is in fact a transfer of ownership in return for a 
lump sum, that license should be regarded as sold. Furthermore, the CJEU 
stated that such transfer of ownership will transform an act of 
communication into an act of distribution. Since nothing in the Software 
Directive precluded the application of distribution onto intangible copies, 
the principle of exhaustion was extended to include downloaded copies of 
computer programs.    
 
The novel interpretation of the CJEU creates a dichotomy with the US 
jurisdiction, since the latter has moved towards greater enforcement of the 
rights of an author. Contrary to the CJEU, the US courts have concluded 
that it depends on the content of the clauses in the license agreement if the 
license is a sale or not. Furthermore, with the recent, still ongoing, case of 
ReDigi, the US courts has refused to accept an extended application of 
exhaustion on digital transfers, since such a transmission involves the 
creation of new copies, which will infringe an author’s exclusive right of 
reproduction.  
 
Looking into the case law, the European stance is emerging as more 
preferable than the US counterpart, as long as the licenses in question are 
transfers of ownership and therefore are actually sold. An unsolved question 
is the theoretical application of exhaustion on other digital works such as 
music. However, this thesis suggests that the extended copyright exhaustion 
created by the CJEU will be applicable on those works.  
 
Making used software legitimate for reselling will have effects on 
legislation, right holders and purchasers. Although uncertainties remain 
regarding the requirement of rendering the copy unusable before resale, the 
UsedSoft case has considerable potential to re-shape the current business 
model in force by software proprietors. Future case law will bring more 
clarification to this new market.   
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Sammanfattning 
 
Denna uppsats belyser de ökande rättsverkningarna det digitala samhället 
har på upphovsrätten. Framför allt har principen om konsumtion av 
upphovsrätt, ett undantag på en författares ensamrätt att sprida sitt arbete, 
erhållit en ny tolkning. Principen innebär att när en rättighetshavare placerar 
dennes upphovsrättsskyddade verk på marknaden till försäljning, är 
spridningsrätten konsumerad, vilket innebär att kopian inte längre kan 
kontrolleras av skaparen. Traditionellt sett har ingen tillämpning av 
konsumtion varit möjligt på digitala varor, eftersom principen har ansetts 
endast omfatta fysiska kopior som säljs och inte licensieras. 
  
EU-domstolen har emellertid slagit fast i det banbrytande rättsfallet 
UsedSoft att principen om konsumtion kan tillämpas på datorprogram eller 
programvara. EU-domstolen konstaterade att om en licens i själva verket är 
en överlåtelse av äganderätten i utbyte mot ett engångsbelopp, bör detta 
tillstånd räknas som en försäljning. Vidare ansåg EU-domstolen att en sådan 
överlåtelse kommer att förvandla en överföringsrätt till allmänheten till en 
spridningsrätt. Eftersom ingenting i mjukvarudirektivet hindrar en 
tillämpning av spridningsrätt på immateriella kopior, kunde principen om 
konsumtion utvidgas till att omfatta nedladdade exemplar av datorprogram. 
 
Denna tolkning av EU-domstolen skapar en dikotomi med USA:s 
jurisdiktion, eftersom den senare har rört sig mot ett ökat skydd av 
rättigheterna för en upphovsrättsinnehavare. De amerikanska domstolarna 
har, i motsats till EU-domstolen, dragit slutsatsen att det beror på 
klausulernas innehåll i licensavtalet om licensen kan räknas som en 
försäljning eller inte. Dessutom, med den senaste, fortfarande pågående, 
rättsfallet ReDigi, har de amerikanska domstolarna vägrat att godta en 
utökad tillämpning av konsumtion på digitala överföringar, eftersom en 
sådan överföring innebär skapandet av nya exemplar, som kommer att bryta 
en författares ensamrätt till mångfaldigande. 
 
Via rättspraxis framstår det europeiska ställningstagandet som mer lämpligt 
än den amerikanska motsvarigheten. Så länge licenserna i fråga är ägarbyten 
och därmed faktiskt säljs, kan konsumtion appliceras. En olöst fråga är den 
teoretiska tillämpningen av konsumtion på andra digitala verk som musik. 
Emellertid föreslår denna uppsats att den utvidgade principen om 
konsumtion av upphovsrätten kommer att vara tillämpliga på dessa arbeten. 
 
Att använd programvara legitimt kan vara föremål för återförsäljning 
kommer att påverka lagstiftning, rättighetsinnehavaren och köparen. Även 
om osäkerheten kvarstår angående kravet på att göra kopian oanvändbart 
före återförsäljning, har UsedSoft-fallet en avsevärd potential i att totalt 
förändra den nuvarande affärsmodellen för mjukvara. Framtida rättspraxis 
från EU-domstolen kommer att leverera fler klargöranden på denna nya 
marknad. 
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copyright and related rights in the 
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IPR   Intellectual Property Rights 
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Software Directive Directive 2009/24/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
legal protection of computer 
programs 
US   United States of America 
WCT   WIPO Copyright Treaty 
WIPO World Intellectual Property 
Organization 
WPPT WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Background 
 
To purchase a pair of worn Nike shoes in a second-hand shop is not a 
peculiar thing today. Proprietors cannot prevent this conduct, as goods 
placed upon the European market will fall under the principle of exhaustion, 
which means that right holders cannot rely on their exclusive rights granted 
by IPR. However, in a digital context, different rules apply. Digital 
distribution not only limits the expenses of a right holder, as physical 
wholesalers are not needed, it additionally severely restricts the costumer 
from reselling the digital product with Digital Rights Management (DRM)
1
 
and End-User License Agreement (EULA).
2
 The vast majority of the 
proprietors doing business on the digital market employ licensing 
agreements, as it has become the standard solution when trading with digital 
copyrighted works
3
, and several are using DRM as a further protection.
4
  
 
Digital literature (‘e-books’), computer games and music files are examples 
of said works in an area with rapid increase in terms of economical 
importance.
5
 Thus, unsurprisingly, new and innovative enterprises have 
emerged in order to benefit from the lucrative digital market. Companies, 
such as ReDigi and UsedSoft, have launched services were the customers are 
able to purchase ‘used’ or ‘pre-sold’ software, i.e. digital products that have 
been sold and used in advance. These companies are essentially performing 
the similar service of a second-hand store, with one exception; the 
reproduction of copies, which is a consequence of using on-line distribution. 
Whereas the second-hand service of physical goods is of no legal 
controversy, the businesses of ReDigi and UsedSoft have created a vast 
number of legal activities, especially from the proprietors in attempts to 
prohibit said services. 
 
The novel concept of reselling digital files underlines the difficulties 
imposed upon copyright law in a digital context, the principal problem is to 
define the status of the software licenses. As the industry has used license 
agreements to avoid activating the rules of copyright exhaustion, the 
                                                 
1
 Technical solutions to prevent anti-circumvention of the exclusive rights granted by 
copyright. 
2
 EULA will be further discussed in chapter 2. 
3
 Noteworthy examples of EULA:s can be found on http://www.adobe.com/products/eulas/ 
and http://www.microsoft.com/en-us/legal/IntellectualProperty/UseTerms/Default.aspx, 
(last visited 23 May 2013). 
4
 See e.g. Windows Media DRM, 
http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/licensing/drmlicensing.aspx (last 
visited on 23 May 2013).  
5
 E.g., the British music industry noted as of 2012, digital sales of music have surpassed 
physical sales of CDs and records for the first time. Sweney, Mark, ‘Digital music 
spending greater than sales of CDs and records for the first time’ The Guardian, 31 May 
2012  http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2012/may/31/digital-music-spending-bpi, (last 
visited on 23 May 2013). 
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conduct of second-hand digital files is problematic indeed. Who is the 
owner of these resold files? Is it possible to protect the conduct under the 
current legislation? One question is if the conduct of preventing the reselling 
of digital files enables proprietors to protect themselves against copyright 
infringement and piracy or if it is in fact impairing the principle of 
exhaustion and as such the Internal Market. Furthermore, the possible 
intersection of private contract law and competition law are additional 
troublesome factors in the matter. Consequently, a thorough examination is 
needed.    
 
1.2 Purpose 
 
The purpose of this paper, with regards to the novel nature of the subject, is 
to determine the practical impact of copyright exhaustion on transmission of 
digital works, especially computer programs. The thesis aims to clarify the 
area of law, and to evaluate the legal status of resold digital files. 
Furthermore, the purpose is to illustrate the legal rationale of second-hand 
sales of digital files, and to review the current standings of the Court. While 
examining the matter, focus will first be on the definition of software 
transmission, whether the applied license agreements precludes any other 
interpretation than ‘license’ of the contractual relationship between a right 
holder and a user. Furthermore, the paper aims to examine whether the 
principle of exhaustion, traditionally applied to physical goods also may 
include digital works. Depending on the result, the consequences will 
additionally be asserted. Finally, the thesis will try to evaluate the findings 
and provide the reader with a legal stance of its own.   
 
1.3 Method and material 
 
The foundation of this thesis will be European copyright law, more 
specifically copyright law that includes intangible goods, and case law of 
the Union Courts. Given the scarce status of case law in the EU, US case 
law and doctrine will additionally be noted when examining copyright 
exhaustion on digital transmissions, especially with the subject of digital 
second-hand sales, as the concept has been more examined overseas. It is 
not within the scope of this thesis to do a comparative study with the US 
legal system; however, analogies will be made, and one chapter will 
illustrate exhaustion in the US. Furthermore, international copyright treaties 
will be of additional value. The dominating method will be a traditional 
legal dogmatic examination of copyright and digital files. Hence, the paper 
will mainly consist of an evaluation of the different sources of law. 
 
Regarding doctrine, there is not an overwhelming amount of material, with 
the primary explanation being the novelty subject. However, this means that 
the existing material is recent. Furthermore, when assessing the doctrine, 
consideration must be made to whether the arguments and information 
provided are stemming from a de lege ferenda or de lege lata perspective. 
These perspectives will also be used in this thesis when discussing the 
findings.  
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Finally, information and inspiration will be gathered from other sources of 
information related to the subject, such as newspaper articles and official 
information, e.g. statistics from EU institutions. When asserting sources 
other than legal doctrine, legislation and case law, a careful stance of 
criticism must be taken towards some, as they may deliver merely 
subjective opinions.   
 
1.4 Delimitation 
 
The concept of second-hand sales of digital files is rather broad. The focus 
will be on software, or computer programs and the clash with copyright law 
and the exhaustion rule. The potential application on other intangible digital 
goods such as music, films and e-books will additionally be analyzed. Ergo, 
the thesis will analyze the possible copyright exhaustion when reselling 
software with an examination of the appropriate provisions in the InfoSoc 
Directive and Software Directive. As such, the thesis will not examine 
national legislation. Other aspects of IPR, such as trademark law, will not be 
regarded, along with other legal areas and perspectives, such as competition 
law and human rights, although they may be noted in the discussion chapter. 
Regarding license agreements, only proprietary licenses will be examined. 
Hence, free and open source licenses are not the target of legal actions 
within the interest of this paper, and will not be additionally addressed. 
Additionally, the discussion of DRM, and its relationship with the right to 
free use cannot be examined in this thesis, since the sole illustration of it 
could cover a thesis on its own. Finally, the reader should be aware of the 
intricate technologic nature of this subject, and should have acquired basic 
knowledge in advance, as this thesis will not include such parts.  
 
1.5 Terminology 
 
Due to the digital dimension of the subject, several technical notions will be 
included in the thesis. These are, together with emphasizes, Latin concepts 
and other linguistic constructs, in Italics. An observant reader will notice 
that this paper follows American English instead of British. Since this paper 
extensively contains licenses, British English was neglected in order to 
avoid confusion, as both ‘licence’ and ‘license’ can be used in British 
English. 
 
1.6 Outline 
 
Introducing the issues of the reselling of digital files, chapter two will 
provide the reader with fundamental knowledge regarding the business 
models of e-commerce and the common techniques in force to prevent 
further reselling of digital files. This knowledge, although descriptive in its 
nature, is necessary in order to assess the implications at hand. 
 
The third chapter will primary consists of the relevant EU legislation 
applicable to the matter. Underlying international treaties, such as the WIPO 
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Copyright Treaties, will additionally aid to outline a firm basis imperative to 
this thesis.  
 
The fourth chapter will describe the relevant EU case law and the AG 
opinions of some of those cases. 
 
The fifth chapter will include a basic illustration of US legislation and the 
case law development of software license agreement in relation to copyright 
law. 
  
The sixth chapter will be an analysis and a discussion, examining the issues 
provided, primarily based on case law from both the EU and the US 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, legal doctrine will be applied, enhancing this 
chapter. 
    
The final chapter will summarize the thesis with a conclusion of the subject 
at hand.  
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2. The basics of Software License 
Agreements 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Before venturing into the legal concept of copyright exhaustion, the 
fundamentals of a software license agreement will be illustrated, in order to 
provide the reader of basic understanding regarding how software is 
regulated and sold through contracts. 
 
As mentioned previously, digital copyrighted works can exist in several 
forms and media, inasmuch as the most common types are e-books, 
computer or video games, films and music.
6
 Though they may all exist in 
physical versions, the common denominator within the concept of ‘digital’ 
is the fact that they are computer programs, or software.
7
 One of the issues 
that arise when dealing with digital copyrighted works is the fact that the 
works are capable of existing in both physical and digital forms.
8
 
Purchasing a physical medium, such as a CD, with the desirable software in 
a physical store includes digital elements, although not pure digital 
purchases per se. The transactions include physical copies in physical 
stores; or the CD.
9
 As the technical improvements of the Internet and the 
speed of broadband connectivity have steadily risen, a large amount of sales 
of digital products is today purely digital.
10
 E.g. one user purchases a code 
online, which enables said person to download software from a home page, 
whereas another purchases a digital music file from services such as 
iTunes.
11
  
 
As mentioned in 1.1, the combination of increasing digital sales and fear of 
software piracy has resulted in different solutions from the proprietors in 
order to restrict the user’s capabilities of management over the work in 
question. Software license agreements are common and less controversial, 
although their legal status may be questioned, while the DRM technology 
has been the target of much criticism.
12
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Simon Stokes, Digital Copyright: Law and practice (3rd edn, Hart Publishing 2009) 22-
23. 
7
 Janusz Piotr Kolczynski, ‘Exhaustion of copyright of computer software online: a 
European (Polish, German, Austrian) and US perspective’ (2011) 33 EIPR 578, 579.  
8
 Stokes (n 5) 24-25. 
9
 ibid 22-23. 
10
 See Sweney (n 4) and the article about digital sales of music.  
11
 Online services licensing software are indeed common today, for instance is the company 
Oracle (claimant in the UsedSoft case (n 90 ) out-licensing business software.  
12
 See chapter 6. 
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2.2 The common categories of Software License 
Agreements 
 
Software license agreements are contractual methods for proprietors to 
stipulate the exact use of their software. Being creations of private contract 
law, the license agreements are in general enforceable although resting upon 
several conditions laid down by the national legal system. As a right holder 
is free to stipulate the provisions, a license agreement should not only be 
regarded as a restriction of the end-users ability to use a work, but also as a 
method for the right holder to permit copyright infringing use.
13
 It must also 
be noted that while the agreement might be considered void, certain clauses 
may still be enforceable.
14
   
 
Two different categories of software license agreements exist: proprietary 
software licenses and free and open source software licenses, where the 
former group restricts the use, the latter generally offers unlimited use.
15
  
Proprietary software licenses consist of agreements, generally labeled as 
end-user license agreements, where the right holder has retained ownership 
over the licensed software through contract, thus the term ‘proprietary’.16 
An acceptance from the end user is required in order to gain access to the 
contracted software. Depending on the type of technology and contract, the 
acceptance of an EULA may vary.
17
 Given the digital context, most 
EULA’s are not expressively written contractual licenses mutually 
negotiated and are instead contracts of adhesion, appearing in several 
different models such as shrink-wrap, click-wrap and browse-wrap 
licenses.
18
  
 
Shrink-wrap licenses are physical contracts included in the package 
containing the software, purchased in physical stores. A user will agree to a 
shrink-wrap license by removing a seal, usually transparent plastic, with a 
warning text encasing e.g. a CD or another physical storage medium 
containing the software.
19
 The legality of this type of license agreement has 
been debated, as the actual physical purchase may be regarded as the 
principal contract, due to the fact that the user has no knowledge of the 
imbedded terms of the shrink-wrap license.
20
 In the US, shrink-wrap license 
agreements have been considered enforceable through case law
21
 whereas 
                                                 
13
 Stokes (n 5) 125. 
14
 Known as severability; Thomas Cottier and Pierre Véron, Concise international and 
European IP law – TRIPS, Paris Convention, European enforcement and transfer of 
technology (2nd edn Kluwer Law International 2011) 505.
 
 
15
 Lawrence Lessig, Code 2.0 (2nd edn, Basic Books 2006) 139.  
16
 Andrew M St Laurent, Understanding Open Source and Free Software Licensing 
(O’Reilly Media Inc. 2008) 119-20. 
17
Jonathan C. Tobin, ‘Licensing As a Means of Providing Affordability and Accessibility in 
Digital Markets: Alternatives to a Digital First Sale Doctrine’ 93 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. 
Soc'y 167 2011 167, 173. 
18
 Stokes (n 5) 126-27. 
19
 ibid 126. 
20
 ibid. 
21
 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447. 
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the EU has the Unfair Contract Terms Directive 93/13/EEC.
22
 A European 
shrink-wrap license contract must i.e. fulfill the requirements of the contract 
law of the Member States, and since a user adheres to a contract without 
knowing the specific details, the contract can be the target of legal action.
23
 
However, the shrink-wrap license per se should be considered as 
enforceable.
24
  
 
Whereas shrink-wrap licenses are only provided with physical copies of 
software, click-wrap licenses can exist in both physical and digital copies.
25
 
These licenses appear as messages on the computer screen when a user is 
installing the software, stating that the product is unavailable unless the user 
accepts the terms and conditions of the click-wrap license by clicking e.g. 
‘YES’ or ‘I ACCEPT’.26 When included in a physical product, the click-
wrap license is similar to a shrink-wrap one, as the user is not aware of the 
specific terms and conditions at the time of the physical purchase. 
Regarding digital purchases and downloads, the click-wrap license is 
utilized as the standard EULA, and the enforceability is not clear. In the US, 
some cases have confirmed the agreements as binding, while in the EU the 
validity is the subject of the contract law of the Member States.
27
  
 
Finally, a third category of software license agreements is the browse-wrap, 
where the user is notified about the license agreement when visiting a 
webpage and before downloading the desirable software. However, there is 
no element of assent as with click-wrap agreements. Thus, the enforceability 
of browse-wrap license agreements is weak.
28
   
                                                 
22
Jiao Xue ‘A Comparative Study of Shrink-Wrap License’ Vol.2, No. 2 2009 Journal of 
Politics and Law 86, 87-88 
http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jpl/article/download/2310/2167 (last visited 23 
May 2013). 
23The Commission has also stated that ‘Nor is it entirely clear whether the practice of so-
called “shrink-wrap licensing” where use conditions are attached to the user, constitute a 
valid licence in all circumstances and in all jurisdiction’. Proposal for a Council Directive 
on the legal protection of computer programs. COM (88) 816 final, 17 March 1989, para 
3.3.  
24
 Stokes (n 5) 126-27. 
25
 ibid. 
26
 Nancy Kim, ‘Clicking and Cringing’, Vol. 86 2008 Oregon Law Review 797, 810.    
27
 Stokes (n 5) 127. 
28
 ibid. 
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3.The legal rationale of exhaustion 
of Copyright in the EU  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in the introduction chapter, the concept of reselling digital 
files is a delicate matter for copyright law. Regarding copyright and digital 
works in a European perspective, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of 
certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society 
(‘InfoSoc Directive’) applies to the general terms, whereas Directive 
2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 
(‘Software Directive’) in particular deals with the subject. However, before 
examining those Directives, the principle of exhaustion must first be 
analyzed.  
 
3.2 The principle of exhaustion 
 
Within the Community the protection of the free movement of goods is 
fundamental, which is upheld through the creation of the Internal Market.  
In order to ensure this borderless market, several sui generis were created, 
such as the exhaustion of rights. This concept, which is fundamental in IPR, 
consists of the scenario: as soon as a proprietor puts e.g. a copyright 
protected product on the market in a Member State, he or she is unable to 
restrict the resale of said product.
29
 The principle of exhaustion is not 
codified under primary EU law
30
, instead it was introduced in the EU with 
the landmark case Deutsche Grammophone.
31
 A German undertaking, 
Deutsche Grammophone, was the proprietor of music records sold in France 
by a subsidiary Polydor. Polydor was forced to charge a lower price on the 
French market than on the German, due to different market conditions. 
Another company, Metro, purchased the records in France and resold them 
in Germany below the admitted price. Deutsche Grammophone attempted to 
prevent the conduct of Metro by claiming copyright infringement and that 
German law prohibited re-importation of copyright-protected products.
32
 
The CJEU stated that: 
 
It would be in conflict with the provisions prescribing the free movement of 
products within the Common Market for a manufacturer of sound recordings to 
exercise the exclusive right to distribute the protected articles, conferred upon him 
by the legislation of a member state, in such a way as to prohibit the sale in that 
                                                 
29
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30
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state of products placed on the market by him or with his consent in another 
member state solely because such distribution did not occur within the territory of 
the first member state.
33
   
 
Ergo, if a right holder, or someone with the consent of the right holder, 
markets products in one Member State, he or she cannot prevent those 
products from being resold in another Member State, as it would become an 
obstacle to the principle of free movement of goods. The principle of 
exhaustion applies to all tangible goods. Furthermore, the principle 
generally applies to the distribution of copyrighted work, although 
reproduction is still maintained under the exclusive rights of the author.
34
  
 
Ergo, a costumer is able to purchase a book and resell it, but is prevented 
from copying it and selling those copies. However, if said book would be an 
e-book, problems will emerge, as digital products are not regarded as 
tangible assets. Such issues, introduced through the digital technology 
advancement, forced a modernization of the traditional copyright created 
through the Berne Convention. 
 
3.3 The Berne Convention 
 
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works is the 
international foundation of copyright protection since 1886. Revised in 1971, it 
grants the protection to all ‘literary and artistic works’, which is defined as 
‘every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever 
may be the mode or form of its expression’.35 Furthermore, it outlines the 
requirements for contracting states to ensure the exclusive rights of an author, 
such as the reproduction right and the broadcast right.36 However, the Berne 
Convention does not address neither exhaustion of rights nor right of 
distribution, hence; it does not prevent exhaustion of the distribution right. 
Additionally, exhaustion of the reproduction right may be in order, as long as it 
does not exceed normal exploitation of a work, whereas exhaustion of the right 
of communication to the public is not feasible.37 As the Berne Convention is 
generally regarded to be a non-self-executing treaty by the Union Member 
States, it needs implementation.38 Several treaties and legislative acts have 
codified the Berne Convention provisions, and in the EU the first, relevant to 
digital goods, was the Software Directive.     
  
                                                 
33
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34
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3.4 Software Directive 
 
3.4.1 Background 
 
The principle of exhaustion was first codified in the Community in the 
Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of 
computer programs, which is now replaced by Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of 
computer programs (‘Software Directive’).39 During the development of 
computer software in the 80’s, the Commission recognized that the 
legislative power regarding IPR had been left to the Member States and that 
the divergent result was a threat toward the Internal Market. Hence, the 
Commission stated in its 1985 White Paper that harmonizing computer 
software was of utmost priority in order to avoid the divergence and 
securing the Internal Market.
40
 Drafting on the Software Directive began 
with the 1988 Green Paper ‘Copyright and the Challenge of Technology - 
Copyright Issues Requiring Immediate Action’, where the Commission 
stated that software should be considered as literary works under the scope 
of the Berne Convention.
41
 However, software was to be regarded as a sui 
generis, due to its peculiar technical nature. For instance, ‘use’ per se in the 
common copyright regime did not create legal dilemmas, whereas defining 
‘use’ was fundamental in the world of software.42  
 
The Commission continued with realizing that exhaustion of rights on a 
general copyright level was an example of discrepancy between Member 
States
43, although it came to the conclusion that ‘a broad distribution right 
and harmonization of exhaustion provisions do not appear to call for 
legislative initiatives at Community level at the present time’44. 
Furthermore, the Commission addressed reproduction of software and the 
complicated relationship to ‘use’. As running software may include 
elements of copying, for example the temporary transfer into the computer 
memory, using a computer program for its purpose will include 
reproduction, and thus the Commission saw the need to define possible 
restriction of use of a computer program
45
. The Commission stated that 
within the scope of a software license agreement, ‘authorized use’ must 
implicate reproduction necessary for the function of the software in 
question. However, the Commission continued with acknowledging that a 
licensor under copyright law could limit the use by reference to e.g. its 
purpose, to merely cover one computer. A licensee could otherwise gain a 
                                                 
39
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40
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disproportionate profit, as a non-restricted reproduction right would entitle 
the user to spread numerous copies from one license
46
.   
 
The Commission also addressed the status of shrink-wrap license 
agreements and possible resale: 
 
This kind of software is sold rather than licensed, although many suppliers try to 
maintain the character of a license agreement. Typical restrictions on the user 
provide that he is only allowed to use the program on one computer at a time and 
that he is authorized to pass on the licensed material to a third party under the 
condition that he does not retain a copy of it and no longer makes use of the 
software. This reflects the need for the supplier to impede the simultaneous use by 
more than one user of a program for which only one fee has been paid. On the 
other hand, the authorization to transfer the software to other parties pays tribute to 
the sales-like character of the marketing of this type of software and to the public 
interest in its free circulation.
47
 
 
The Commission did elaborate this further in the Proposal following the 
Green Paper, commenting on the relationship between software and contract 
law, due to the common practice of licensing agreements. Although license 
agreements enabled proprietors to restrict the use of the software, the 
Commission stated that in some instances the relationship between the 
proprietor and the costumer could be unequal, e.g. when the licensor 
enjoyed a strong market position. Thus, the Commission suggested that the 
Software Directive should provide for a basic protection regarding granting 
and limitation of exclusive rights, where the right holder must decide 
whether the distribution should be through sales or licensing.
48
 
 
3.4.2 Provisions 
 
Under the Software Directive, all forms of computer programs are protected. 
This formulation is rather vague, especially in the contemporary digital 
society where different media can be regarded as software, and where they 
can be transfused with each other. However, the Infosoc Directive 
expressively excludes computer programs whereas music, films and books 
are represented.
49
 This has resulted in the general understanding that digital 
music, films and books do not fall under the scope of the Software 
Directive
50
, a view that will be addressed further in chapter six.  
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As with other IPR legislation, the Software Directive grants exclusive rights 
to the right holder. This includes the ability to control the distribution and 
use of software. Regarding the doctrine of exhaustion, it is important to 
remember that the principle applies to the distribution and not the use. Use 
is however safeguarded by the Directive in order to permit legitimate use of 
the software without requiring additional licenses.
51
  
 
Art. 4(2) codifies the principle of exhaustion: 
 
The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the right holder or 
with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the Community of that 
copy, with the exception of the right to control further rental of the program or a 
copy thereof. 
 
In its Proposal of 1988, the Commission commented on the suggested 
articles. It acknowledged that the Berne Convention did not contain any 
specific rights to control the distribution, however, the exclusive right of 
controlling reproduction,  given in 4(1)(a) in the Directive, enabled a right 
holder to control his/her work. The Commission stated that the ability of an 
author to control reproduction is fundamental in order to have a satisfactory 
computer program protection. However, given the functioning of computer 
programs where ordinary use of the software created copies, the exclusive 
right could be limited, see Article 5(1).
52
  
 
Regarding distribution and exhaustion, the Commission held in its Proposal 
that ‘rental, leasing and licensing’ should avoid being the target of 
exhaustion. The reason being that it was ‘essential to permit right holders to 
control the rental of programs which have been sold or licensed if copying 
of programs without authorization is to be prevented’. However, the 
principle of exhaustion, stated as ‘first sale’, should be applied as soon as a 
product had been sold with the consent of the right holder.
53
  
 
Ergo, in some circumstances, especially regarding rental of software, the 
Commission held that the exhaustion doctrine should not apply, due to the 
fear of illegal copying. With that said, the exclusive rights given in Article 4 
are limited in Article 5, in which the first paragraph contains the following: 
 
1. In the absence of specific contractual provisions, the acts referred to in points 
(a) and (b) of Article 4(1) shall not require authorization by the rightholder 
where they are necessary for the use of the computer program by the lawful 
acquirer in accordance with its intended purpose, including for error 
correction.
54
 
 
The Article entitles the ‘lawful acquirer’ to use software within its purpose 
without requiring authorization from the right holder. The notion of ‘lawful 
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acquirer’ is not defined in the Directive, however, the Commission has 
stated that it should include ‘a purchaser, licensee, renter or a person 
authorised to use the program on behalf of one of the above’.55 
 
In the Proposal, the Commission elaborated the discussion of license 
agreements and shrink-wrap agreements additionally as a method to justify 
limitations of software use. With the notion of ‘specific contractual 
provisions’, the Commission referred to expressively ‘written license 
agreements signed by both parties’. The term ‘licensed’ in the Directive was 
aimed towards the common comprehension of the concept, which were 
precisely defined provisions governed by contractual agreement. Shrink-
wrap licenses did not fulfill this requirement, as costumers were made aware 
of the terms after the actual purchase, arranged in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ 
contract. Thus the Commission drew the conclusion that a purchaser of 
software arranged as a shrink-wrap license could claim limitation of 
exclusive rights under Article 5(1), the reason being ‘a necessary 
compromise between the interests of suppliers and consumers of computer 
programs’.56  
 
Before venturing further into the Software Directive and the applicable case 
law, the InfoSoc Directive must also be examined, in order to determine the 
relationship between the Directives and other digital files not considered 
software. As the Software Directive is lex specialis to the InfoSoc Directive, 
the general applicable doctrine of exhaustion will be found here. However, 
the WCT will first be briefly addressed.   
 
3.5 WCT 
 
The Berne Convention was not drafted to comply with the difficult 
copyright issues raised by the computing development process; hence WIPO 
issued meetings in the 90’s aimed to solve the matter.  Two treaties, the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (‘WCT’) and the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty (‘WPPT’), were drafted and adopted in 1996. WCT 
deals with the application of copyright in a digital context, aimed by the 
legislators to control access to digital works. It was created alongside the 
WPPT, which deals with performers and producers of phonograms.
57
 
 
Only expressions fall under the scope of the copyright protection in the 
WCT.
58
 Within this scope computer programs are also protected and are 
considered literary works regardless their technical form.
 59
Regarding the 
principle of exhaustion, art 6 WCT provides guidance:  
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1. Authors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of 
authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of 
their works through sale or other transfer of ownership. 
2. Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the freedom of Contracting Parties to 
determine the conditions, if any, under which the exhaustion of the right in 
paragraph (1) applies after the first sale or other transfer of ownership of the 
original or a copy of the work with the authorization of the author. 
 
The distribution right provided in Art. 6 (1) is aimed to cover only tangible 
goods.
60
 Furthermore, regarding the principal of exhaustion, Art. 6 (2) states 
that the embracing parties to the Treaty are free to decide the 
implementation of the principle. However, transmission to the public could 
be applied to digital intangible products. The concept of transmission, 
‘making available right’61, is the expression of the creator's exclusive right 
to spread his or her works to the public e.g. through communication, 
outlined in Art. 8 WCT. Ergo, making copies available to the public. The 
communication to the public was covered under the Berne Convention, this 
however dealt with physical public performances, and not the digital 
challenge.
62
  
 
The rather neutral characterization, neither defined as communication nor 
distribution, of the description of transmissions was the result of discussions 
in the preparatory work. During said discussion, it was found that major 
discrepancies existed in national law regarding the right to communicate and 
the right to distribute and no consensus could be reached as to which right 
prevails over the other. Added to this was the complicated nature of digital 
transmissions. Hence, it was decided that digital transmission should be 
described without specific legal characterization. This was left open to be 
decided in national legislation, and the solution was referred to as the 
‘umbrella situation’.63 The solution could also deal with the fact that a 
transmission could be a hybrid of both communication and distribution, 
which many digital transmissions in fact are, with regards to temporary 
copies.
64
 
 
It is important to notice the difference between ‘distribution’ and 
‘communication’ as regulated by the WCT, since no doctrine of exhaustion 
applies to ‘communication’. In order to examine the discrepancy between 
the concepts, the corresponding implementation act in the Community must 
be regarded. In the EU, the InfoSoc Directive was the result of said 
implementation of WCT and WPPT.  
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3.6 InfoSoc 
 
The InfoSoc Directive regulates the copyright and related rights regarding 
the technological developments in the information society, and was created 
to enhance the harmonization of copyright in the internal market. Stemming 
from the treaties adopted by WIPO in 1996, the work to harmonize the 
field-of-law had already begun earlier in 1995 with the Green Paper 
launched by the Commission. However, only a lesser amount of the 
measures listed in this Paper was incorporated in the InfoSoc Directive, as 
the provisions provided by the WIPO Treaties had precedence.
65
  Regarding 
exhaustion and intangible goods, the sections containing the exclusive rights 
of distribution and transmission to the public are of main interest.  These are 
stipulated in Article 3 and 4 of the Directive.
66
 
 
The principle of exhaustion is implemented under Article 4(2) Infosoc 
Directive. Comparing the exclusive rights of communication and 
distribution, exhaustion of rights seems to only target distribution, and 
additionally only tangible goods, as stated in the preamble to the Directive.
67
 
Furthermore, recital 29 in the preamble gives guidance regarding 
transmission of intangible goods, categorizing it as an online service which 
is subject to authorization.
68
  
 
With the EU legislation illustrated, a couple of apparent questions have 
emerged. First of all, it is clear that the principle of exhaustion applies to 
tangible goods. Nevertheless, can the principle be applied to intangible 
goods such as digital files, or rather; does the notion of ‘distribution’ include 
on-line transmission? On the exclusive right of distribution, given in Article 
4(1)(c) Software Directive, the notion of ‘any form’ of distribution suggests 
that digital distribution fall under the scope of the exclusive rights of a right 
holder. As such, that exclusive right of distribution could arguably be 
exhausted by the first sale in the Community.  
 
On the other hand, the right of distribution in the Infosoc Directive does not 
cover intangible goods, and the Commission has expressively stated that 
exhaustion shall not be applicable on intangible goods.
69
 
                                                 
65
 Mazziotti (n 28) 49-52. 
66
 See Supplement A. 
67
 Recital 28 InfoSoc Directive (n 48) states the following: ‘copyright protection under this 
Directive includes the exclusive right to control distribution of the work incorporated in a 
tangible article’. 
68
 ‘The question of exhaustion does not arise in the case of services and online services in 
particular. This also applies with regard to a material copy of a work or other subject-
matter made by a user of such a service with the consent of the rightholder. Therefore, the 
same applies to rental and lending of the original and copies of works or other subject-
matter which are services by nature. Unlike CD-ROM or CD-I, where the intellectual 
property is incorporated in a material medium, namely an item of goods, every on-line 
service is in fact an act which should be subject to authorization where the copyright or 
related right so provides.’ 
69
 ‘As to the exhaustion of copyright it must be borne in mind that under the Directive 
Community exhaustion only applies to the sale of copies i.e. goods, whereas supply 
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Furthermore, another issue revolves around ownership and software, which 
is important when determining the relationship between sale and licensing. 
Also, as illustrated in chapter 3.2.2, a user could seek protection under the 
exceptions granted in Article 5 Software Directive. However, it is unclear 
whether this applies to third parties. Ergo, is used software ‘sold’ and may a 
purchaser of it be regarded as a lawful acquirer?  
 
Therefore, the following issues need to be examined with case law and 
doctrine: 
 
 The definition of the involved transmission in a software license 
agreement. Are computer programs sold or licensed? 
 When can the copyright exhaustion apply to digital transmissions? 
 How can a purchaser of a license be regarded as a lawful acquirer? 
 Which effect will the above have on license agreements? 
 May other digital products be included, such as music and films? 
 Which consequences will the result have on the legal terrain? 
 Is the result reasonable? 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
Oral Question H-0436/95 by Arthur Newens, MEP (11.7.1995), Debates of the EP (EN 
ed.) No. 466, 174. 
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4. Case law 
 
4.1 Coditel I 
 
After the Deutsche Grammophone case, the CJEU judged a number of cases 
regarding tangible goods and the principle of exhaustion. However, in the 
beginning of the 1980’s, the CJEU addressed exhaustion and the exclusive 
right of communication to the public in the Coditel cases, where Coditel I 
70
is of main interest. In Coditel I, a French company made an exclusive 
license agreement regarding a film transmission with a Belgian company 
Ciné Vog. Additionally, the licensor had more license agreements with 
companies in other Member States, such as Germany. The German licensee 
did not have the same restricting provisions as Ciné Vog, which could not 
show the film until 40 months had passed after its opening in the cinemas. 
When the film was shown in German television, a Belgian television 
company, Coditel, managed to receive the signal from Germany and show 
the film on its cable channels. Ciné Vog filed for copyright infringement 
and violation of its exclusive license agreement, whereas Coditel claimed 
that the film was exhausted, as the original French licensor had shown the 
movie with consent.
71
   
 
Acknowledging the issue with intangible goods, the CJEU stated that Art. 
56 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union, which 
prohibited restrictions of the free movement of services, did not prevent a 
right holder to use national legislation in order to protect IPR, apart from 
circumstances where said application would create barriers between 
Member States. Examining the situation, the CJEU held that the conduct of 
granting merely one exclusive license agreement per Member State did not 
constitute trade barriers.
72
  
 
Regarding the possible exhaustion, the CJEU stated that it was necessary for 
a right holder to be able to prevent unauthorized communications to the 
public, as the possibilities for an author to profit from his/her work would 
otherwise be undermined. Hence the CJEU judged in favour for Ciné Vog, 
and created the view that exhaustion did not apply to intangible goods.
73
   
  
After Coditel I, the Community case law development has been in hiatus 
regarding the potential application of copyright exhaustion on digital works. 
However, the recent years have seen a few important judgments in the area, 
especially the Premier League and UsedSoft cases.  
 
4.2 Premier League 
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4.2.1 Background 
 
The joined cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, Football Association Premier 
League v QC Leisure YouTube and Karen Murphy v Media Protection 
Services Ltd
74
 concerned questions regarding the free movement of 
intangible goods and exhaustion of rights. In the UK, BSkyB had the 
exclusive rights to broadcast Premier League football matches. However, 
pubs had purchased decoder cards from Greece enabling them to show said 
matches by using the broadcast from the Football Association Premier 
League licensed Greek company NOVA. These decoder cards were 
considerably cheaper compared to the equivalent British cards, although 
legitimate cards and not pirated.
 75
 The FAPL filed complaints to UK courts, 
claiming that the use of Greek decoder cards were copyright infringements 
as ‘it undermined the exclusivity of the rights granted by license in a given 
territory and hence the value of those rights’, whereas the defendants 
claimed that preventing them from purchasing goods and services from 
another Member State would impair the Internal Market.
76
 The High Court 
of Justice stayed proceedings and referred several questions to the CJEU, of 
whom merely those concerning IPR and freedom of goods will be further 
illustrated.
77
 
 
4.2.1 AG opinion 
 
In her opinion
78
, AG Kokott addressed the protection of the Internal Market, 
stating that the contested freedom at hand was the freedom of services, as 
the goods in question, the Greek decoder cards, were not desired as such; it 
was the use of the cards or i.e. the service they provided that were the key.  
Furthermore, in her view, it was clear that the conduct of FAPL was 
impairing the freedom to provide services
79
. The restriction needed to be 
justified in public interest in order to be acceptable. Citing Coditel, the AG 
held that protecting IPR could be a justification, if the protection fulfilled 
the subject-matter
80
 of the IPR in question. Regarding distribution of goods, 
when a right holder received payment from a sale, the principle of 
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exhaustion removes the ability to claim violation of the specific subject-
matter.
81
  
 
However, as this case revolved around services, the AG contemplated over 
the possibility to extend the exhaustion doctrine to services. While 
observing that traditional services, such as receiving a haircut, could not be 
re-used per se and thus not under the scope of the principle of exhaustion, 
AG Kokott held that a number of services in reality were very similar to 
goods. Intangible goods, for example software, e-books, films and music, 
could easily be passed on through i.e. download.
82
  According to the AG, 
the extensive use of different DRM technologies from right holders to 
prevent transfers of copyrighted works further consolidated that statement. 
By utilizing their exclusive rights on the digital market, the right holders 
created market partitioning, and also incentives for costumers to illegally get 
the restricted items. AG Kokott continued by examining the subject-matter, 
or whether the protection of broadcasts in the Community required a 
partitioned market, in order to find justifications.
 83
 She argued that FAPL 
could not invoke the Coditel I case, as the latter concerned different 
segments of services
84
, whereas ‘the partitioning of the internal market for 
live football transmissions is precisely not intended to protect any other 
form of exploitation of the transmitted football match’.85 With that said, AG 
Kokott held that the deciding factor when analyzing the subject-matter was 
the commercial exploitation. Since FAPL received remuneration through 
selling decoder cards, albeit with different prices in different Member 
States
86
, that commercial exploitation was fulfilled.  Hence, the AG 
concluded that a partitioning of the Internal Market cannot be justified in 
order to safeguard the rights to football broadcasts.
 87
  
 
4.2.2 Judgment 
 
The CJEU, although following AG Kokott in the other questions, did 
unfortunately not examine her suggestion on a possible application of the 
principle of exhaustion on services. Instead the CJEU examined the issues 
primarily on a basis of the freedom to provide services and the InfoSoc 
Directive.
88
 The Court stated that national legislation that prohibited foreign 
decoder cards was restricting the Union Treaty provisions on freedom to 
provide services. The restriction could not be justified by claiming 
protection of IPR, as the broadcasting of the football matches per se could 
not meet the requirements of ‘works’ under the InfoSoc Directive.89 
Furthermore, the Court held that, if Member States still would confer IPR 
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upon sport events within their jurisdiction, the contested restriction would 
still not be justified. The reason being that the remuneration system 
employed by the FAPL encouraged market partitioning, which went beyond 
what was necessary to assure satisfactory remuneration to the proprietors.
90
   
 
Although the CJEU did not address the potential application of the doctrine 
of exhaustion in Premier League, it would do so in a highly noticed case the 
following year in UsedSoft. 
 
4.3 UsedSoft  
 
4.3.1 Background 
 
In UsedSoft
91
 the CJEU examined software, licensing and the application of 
exhaustion. Oracle, one the world’s largest software developers, distributed 
the contested software in Member States. This distribution was primarily 
done through direct download, by the users, from websites owned by 
Oracle. A license agreement granted the end user to have a permanent copy 
on a server, and also to have a defined number of users having a copy stored 
on the work-station computers. The licenses could be granted as ‘group 
licenses’ for a total of 25 users. Updated versions and so-called patches of 
the software could additionally be downloaded from the websites. The 
software could be stored on tangible assets, such as a DVD, by customer 
request.
92
 In the license agreement the following was stated under ‘Grant of 
rights’:   
 
With the payment for services you receive, exclusively for your internal business 
purposes, for an unlimited period a non-exclusive non-transferable user right free 
of charge for everything that Oracle develops and makes available to you on the 
basis of this agreement.
93
 
 
The defendant, the German company UsedSoft, purchased user licenses 
from the customers of Oracle which had a redundancy of licenses, such as 
the group licenses
94
, and then resold those on their own website. After 
purchasing a used license, a customer downloads the software from the 
website of Oracle.
95
  
 
Oracle filed an application in the Regional Court in Munich, in order to 
prevent the conduct of UsedSoft. The court granted the application, and 
UsedSoft appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof
96
. The Bundesgerichtshof held 
that UsedSoft infringed Oracle’s exclusive right of reproduction of 
computer programs within the meaning of Article 4(1)(a) of the Software 
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Directive. A purchaser of the used licenses was not entitled to reproduce 
copies by acquiring a valid transferred right, as the exclusive license 
agreement stated that the right to use the software were ‘non-
transferrable’.97 However, the court was uncertain over several issues and 
referred three questions to the CJEU. The Bundesgerichtshof first asked 
about the application of Article 5(1); whether a ‘person who can rely on 
exhaustion of the right to distribute a copy of a computer program [is] a 
“lawful acquirer” within the meaning of Directive 2009/24’.98  
 
In the second question, the court was uncertain over the interpretation of 
exhaustion of distribution transposed in Article 4(2) of the Software 
Directive, especially the legal dilemma whether to include digital 
distribution in the scope of said article. The Bundesgerichtshof referred the 
second question as follows: ‘is the right to distribute a copy of a computer 
program exhausted in accordance with the first half-sentence of Article 4(2) 
of Directive 2009/24 when the acquirer has made the copy with the 
rightholder’s consent by downloading the program from the internet onto a 
data carrier?’.99 
 
In the final question, the court contemplated over whether the exhaustion 
doctrine still would apply if the first purchaser had erased his/her copy. The 
Bundesgerichtshof asked: ‘can a person who has acquired a “used” software 
license for generating a program copy as “lawful acquirer” under Article 
5(1) and the first half-sentence of Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24 also rely 
on exhaustion of the right to distribute the copy of the computer program 
made by the first acquirer with the rightholder’s consent by downloading the 
program from the internet onto a data carrier if the first acquirer has erased 
his program copy or no longer uses it?’.100 
 
4.3.2 AG opinion 
 
AG Bot delivered an Opinion
101
 regarding the delicate matter. By 
considering that the second question must be examined before the others, he 
first observed the claims of the parties. UsedSoft claimed that the notion of 
‘first sale’ could be applicable despite no transfer of ownership, as the 
fundamental factor was the commercial exploitation. Since Oracle made the 
copies available for an unlimited time in return for payment, UsedSoft 
argued that they were in fact sold, and thus subject to the doctrine of 
exhaustion.
102
 Oracle on the other hand replied that the remuneration model 
in force received payment on the foundation of a license agreement, where 
the user paid for the right to use, and not for owning the copy as such. The 
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company additionally argued that that Community legislation explicitly 
excluded exhaustion on intangible assets.
103
    
    
AG Bot approached the matter by first of all reminding the importance of 
achieving the Internal Market and safe-guarding the exhaustion doctrine. He 
continued with observing the fact that only distribution in form of sale could 
be exhausted, although if a sale has been ascertained, all different methods 
of distribution were the subject of exhaustion of rights. Noting the legal 
debate, especially the US one, over the potential application of exhaustion in 
a digital context, the AG held that the contractual relationship between the 
proprietor and the purchaser must be analyzed in order to determine whether 
a ‘sale’ had occurred or not. Oracle claimed it did not sell copies, merely 
made them available through its website. Oracle also argued that the license 
agreement did not transfer any rights of ownership.
 104
   
 
Bot did not agree with this reasoning, stating that ‘a computer program or a 
copy of such a program must be regarded as being sold within the meaning 
of Article 4(2) of that directive where the transaction, however it may have 
been described by the parties, involves the transfer of ownership of a copy 
of the computer program, for an unlimited period of time, in return for the 
payment of a one-off fee’.105 The AG continued with commenting software 
license agreements, observing that a key factor was to examine the content 
of the authorization to use granted by the license. When the license included 
a limited time frame of use and periodic payments, the AG identified it 
more as a rental, whereas if the license included unlimited use for a one-
time payment, it should be regarded more as a sale. Bot held that the notion 
of sale in Article 4(2) Software Directive must be given a broad 
interpretation, as the principle of exhaustion would otherwise be rendered 
useless, since distributors would merely call all agreements licenses instead 
of sales in order to circumvent the rule.
106
 However, granting the contested 
licenses the status of ‘sold’ was not enough to apply exhaustion, as the AG 
contemplated over the fact that Oracle claimed that exhaustion only applied 
to tangible goods.  Noting the arguments stemming from the InfoSoc 
Directive, inter alia that transmission of digital goods could not be 
classified as distribution but rather as communication to the public, the AG 
astonishingly rejected those arguments. Bot first of all held that Article 
1(2)(a) InfoSoc Directive stated that the Directive should not affect existing 
EU legislation regarding the legal protection of computer programs. The 
Software Directive did not include the right of communication, and the right 
of distribution was broadly defined to include ‘all form of distribution’.107 
Furthermore, as the InfoSoc Directive did not include a definition of the 
right to communicate works to the public, the interpretation of that right 
must be made with regards to the WCT, according to Bot. Art. 6(1) WCT 
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defines distribution as the right to make a work available to the public 
‘through sale or other transfer of ownership’.108 
 
Ergo, the AG stated that transfer of ownership transformed the 
communication to the public into a distribution.  The AG also identified that 
the preamble to the InfoSoc Directive was ‘neither clear nor 
unambiguous’.109 Finally, he held that removing the application of the 
exhaustion doctrine on internet downloads would limit the scope of Article 
4(2) severely and would also restrict the Internal Market. Such restriction 
could be justified under Article 36 TFEU, if it safeguarded the specific 
subject-matter of copyright. Quoting Premier League, the AG held that by 
receiving an appropriate remuneration, Oracle could not claim additional 
protection to its specific subject-matter. As such, the AG concluded that the 
principle of exhaustion applied.
110
  
 
Regarding the first and third question, the AG stated that a clear distinction 
must be made between the exhaustible right of distribution and the non-
exhaustible right of reproduction. The contested user license granted rights 
of use within the ambit of the right of reproduction, not distribution, as a 
costumer was entitled to download a new copy and reproduce an existing 
one.
111
 Bot argued that the right of reproduction applicable in this case could 
not be limited by Article 5(1) Software Directive, since that provision did 
not grant a user the right to reproduce for a general use. He held additionally 
that Article 5(1) should only apply to costumers in an agreement with the 
right holder, where said agreement did not contain explicit provisions.
112
 
The AG feared that by extending the scope of exhaustion to include the right 
of reproduction, although justified in order to secure an effective exhaustion 
doctrine and maintaining the Internal Market, it would pose a serious threat 
to the principle of legal certainty. Hence he concluded that second acquirer, 
although lawful, could not claim exhaustion of the right to reproduce.
113
 
 
4.3.3 Judgment 
 
The CJEU also held that the second question should be examined first. It 
contemplated over the notion of ‘sale’ discussed by AG Bot, and held, 
similar to the AG, that ‘sale’ was ‘an agreement by which a person, in return 
for payment, transfers to another person his rights of ownership in an item 
of tangible or intangible property belonging to him’.114 The conduct of 
Oracle to grant the right to use a copy for an unlimited time in return for a 
payment made the CJEU decide the following: 
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The making available by Oracle of a copy of its computer program and the 
conclusion of a user license agreement for that copy are thus intended to make 
the copy usable by the customer, permanently, in return for payment of a fee 
designed to enable the copyright holder to obtain a remuneration corresponding 
to the economic value of the copy of the work of which it is the proprietor.
115
 
 
Thus, the CJEU regarded the software licenses as sales within the meaning 
of Article 4(2) Software Directive.  
 
The court did furthermore reject all arguments regarding the fact that the 
concept of ‘making available’ should be interpreted under Article 3(1) 
InfoSoc Directive, and therefore non-exhaustible. The CJEU held that since 
the Software Directive constituted a lex specialis in relation to the InfoSoc 
Directive, the provisions in the former had precedence. Following the 
reasoning of the AG, the court pointed out the fact that a transfer of 
ownership transformed communication to the public into distribution, 
removing the possibility to label the transmission as a communication to the 
public.
116
 The CJEU continued by stating that nothing in the Software 
Directive gave rise to the interpretation that it did not include intangible 
copies in its scope, which the InfoSoc Directive expressively precluded.  As 
the AG proposed, the CJEU held that a limitation of the exhaustion doctrine 
on downloaded and resold copies of computer programs ‘would go beyond 
what is necessary to safeguard the specific subject-matter of the intellectual 
property concerned’.117 
 
Asserting the claim of Oracle that the agreements sold by the first acquirer 
would create new copies when purchased by a costumer of UsedSoft 
through updates, which would prevent exhaustion, the CJEU held that the 
ability to download corrections ‘form an integral part of the copy’ and must 
be included in the interpretation of ‘sale’.118 However, the court stated that 
the first acquirer could not ‘divide the license and resell only the user right 
for the computer program concerned corresponding to a number of users 
determined by him’.119 The original purchaser was required by the court, in 
order to not violate the exclusive right of reproduction, to render his/her 
copy unusable to be able to resell it. With that said, the CJEU concluded 
that the answer to the second question was that intangible computer 
programs were the subject of the principle of exhaustion.
120
  
 
As the AG, the CJEU examined the first and third question together.
121
 
Looking into Article 5(1) Software Directive, the court observed that a 
purchaser of software digitally distributed must download the software to 
his/her computer, which must be regarded as a necessary reproduction in 
order to use the program. Noting recital 13 in the preamble of the Software 
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Directive
122
, the CJEU held that, since the exhaustion of distribution is 
applicable, a right holder could not prevent resale by enforcing contractual 
provisions restricting further transmission.
123
 However, as the CJEU 
previously stated, the copy subject to resale must be made unusable by the 
seller in order to be accepted. Deciding whether a copy had been made 
unusable or not was indeed an intriguing matter, as the court acknowledged, 
although not a novel problem, as the same problem existed with physical 
medium, as e.g. a DVD; it was problematic for a right holder to ascertain 
that such distribution was not illegally copied. Thus, the CJEU granted right 
holders the ability to include technical protection, for instance product keys 
tied to the specific software.
124
 The CJEU rejected the claims arguing that a 
lawful acquirer could only relate to the person authorized to use the software 
under a license agreement. This interpretation would hinder the application 
of the exhaustion of distribution, as a right holder would merely need to rely 
upon his exclusive right of reproduction to prevent the exhaustion.
125
 Thus 
the CJEU did not follow the recommendations of AG Bot regarding the first 
and third question. Considering its reasoning, the CJEU held that an 
acquirer of used software did fall under the meaning of lawful acquirer in 
Article 5(1), and thus could rely on exhaustion rights provided for the 
original purchaser.
126
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5. Exhaustion in the USA  
 
5.1 Origin 
 
The exhaustion of copyright, or as the concept is framed in the US; the 
principle of first sale, was created in the case Bobbs-Merrill.
127
 Bobbs-
Merrill Co was the publisher and proprietor of a novel which, expressively 
stated on its cover, was to be sold at a minimum price of $1. Prices less than 
$1 were to be regarded as copyright infringement. Another company, R. H. 
Macy & Company, purchased the books at wholesale at a significant lower 
price, and resold them for 89 cents.  The plaintiff claimed copyright 
infringement as the books were sold below $1 and without consent.
128
 The 
Supreme Court stated that although the copyright statutes protect the 
proprietor’s right to reproduce his/her work and sell that production, it does 
not confer rights to limit resale.
129
Thus, after the initial sale of a product, the 
right holder cannot prevent further sales.  
 
The First Sale doctrine was codified in the US Copyright Act of 1909, 
which was updated to its current version of 1976.
130
 The section 109 (a) of 
the Act provides that ‘the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord’. However, this only 
applies to the exclusive distribution right of authors codified in section 106 
(3).  
 
Software is included in the subject-matter of US copyright law 17 U.S.C. § 
102.
131
 Software programs are granted additional limitations on the 
exclusive rights of a right holder in 17 U.S.C. § 117, which grants 
reproduction for any purpose of use within the functioning of the 
program.
132
 
  
5.2 Criteria 
 
In order to claim a First Sale doctrine defense to copyright infringement, 
four criteria are required to be fulfilled. Firstly, the product in question must 
have been lawfully created with the consent of the proprietor. Secondly, the 
copy in question must have been transferred with the consent of the right 
holder. Thirdly, the invoker of First Sale doctrine defense must qualify as 
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the lawful owner of copy. Fourthly, upon owning the copy, the invoker must 
merely have disposed and not reproduced that copy.
133
  
 
Applying these criteria on a hypothetical reselling of digital products, the 
first and second question are generally undisputable, as purchasing e.g. a 
song on iTunes is a legal purchase and transmission with consent of the 
right holder. However, the third and forth criteria rise questions regarding 
the applicability of the First Sale doctrine on digital products and software. 
With the practice of utilizing license agreements when selling digital goods, 
an end user will have problems when claiming he/she is a lawful owner of 
the product, as the right holder generally retains ownership. Furthermore, 
considering the technical features of digital transfers, it is problematic to 
ascertain whether it is the original digital product that has been transferred 
in a reselling, or an identical replicated copy.
134
 US cases involving the 
intersection of license agreements, the First Sale doctrine and digital 
products have increased in numbers, especially in the last decade, when US 
courts have tried to solve the issues concerning the third and forth criteria.   
 
5.3 Case law 
 
5.3.1 MAI 
 
In addition to define the enforceability of end user license agreements in the 
90’s135, US courts examined the relationship of licensing and ownership. 
The United States Court of Appeal of the Ninth Circuit asserted in 1993 the 
First Sale principle and computer software in the MAI case.
136
 The company 
Peak, when repairing computer systems containing the software made by 
MAI, copied the software temporarily to the Random Access Memory 
(RAM) of other computers, and then transferred it back when the repair was 
complete. Purchasers of MAI computers were licensed to utilize the 
software of MAI, however, third parties were not and thus MAI sued Peak 
for copyright infringement.
 137
 The Ninth Circuit stated that a temporary 
copy of software onto RAM was still to be regarded as a copy, as it was 
permanent enough and existed more than transient time period.
138
 The court 
also held that due to the fact that end users of MAI’s software were 
licensees, 17 U.S.C. § 117 did not apply.
139
 Ergo, end users of software 
license agreements were not considered to own the licensed software, and as 
such, the First Sale doctrine could not be applied. In the MAI and two 
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subsequent cases
140
, the courts formulated what should be called the Wall 
criteria from the latest case. A transmission is a  license when a copyright 
owner: (1) transfers a copy of a copyrighted work; (2) retains title; (3) limits 
the uses to which the work may be put; and (4) is compensated periodically 
based on the transferee's exploitation of the materials. 
 
5.3.2 SoftMan 
 
In the case SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., the District Court 
for the Central District of California examined sales of software licenses.
141
 
In a dual case, Adobe Systems, which develops and publish computer 
software, counterclaimed that the original plaintiff SoftMan Products, also 
distributing software, was infringing its software and license terms by 
distributing unauthorized copies of Adobe software. SoftMan purchased 
bundles of Adobe software and separated them into single products, which 
were resold through a website. Adobe alleged that this conduct violated the 
EULA, as licensees were prohibited to unbundle the product, and that it was 
detrimental to the company’s ability to control the distribution of the 
products. Furthermore, Adobe argued that the First Sale doctrine could not 
be used as a defense, as the company merely licensed its products, not sold 
them. SoftMan responded that the First Sale doctrine was indeed applicable, 
that the EULA was not applicable since SoftMan was not a licensee and 
thus contended that its conduct was legal.
142
  
 
The court examined the nature of a purchase of Adobe’s products, and 
stated that they must be regarded as sales, because the purchaser paid a fixed 
price in order to use the software for an unlimited time.
143
 The court 
additionally held that the business model of Adobe would be classified as 
sales rather than licensure, as Adobe sold large quantities to distributors, 
which paid full price, accepted the risk of potential damage to the products 
and potential unsaleable products. SoftMan was also not considered to be 
bound be the EULA as there was no element of assent. With the findings 
combined with the fact that the distributors themselves resold the product to 
other distributors in the secondary market, the court judged that the First 
Sale doctrine applied.
144
 
 
5.3.3 Davidson & Associates 
 
However, in Davidson & Associates v. InternetGateway Inc.
145
, the District 
Court of Missouri had another opinion regarding software licensing and 
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sales. Davidson & Associates, who owned the renowned computer games 
developer Blizzard Entertainment, found that a number of individuals had 
created a server software where they could play their lawfully acquired 
games made by Blizzard. Blizzard already ran service software enabling 
their users to play free on its servers, but the defendants chose to create their 
own since they claimed that by using the software of Blizzard, several 
problems were encountered. The plaintiff sued these individuals for several 
copyright infringements and breach of contract.
146
 The court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Davidson & Associates, stating that the 
defendants merely purchased a license to use the contested software. As 
such, they did neither purchase the actual software nor the ownership. Since 
the defendants could not prove sufficiently that they purchased a product 
with ownership and not merely a license agreement, the First Sale doctrine 
was inapplicable.
147
  
 
5.3.4 Krause 
 
The following year 2005, in Krause v. Titleserv Inc., the Second Circuit 
ruled on software ownership. Mr. Krause had developed specific software 
for Titleserv, and limited the company’s use to prohibit changes to the 
source code. However, Titleserv made various alterations to the code and 
Krause sued the company for copyright infringement.
148
 Krause claimed that 
the software should be regarded as licensed, but the court disagreed and 
stated that Titleserv was the owner of the software. The decisive reason was 
the fact that the software was custom made for a specific company rather 
than the common market, and thus the risk for replication was negligible.
149
  
 
5.3.5 Aftermath 
 
The legal uncertainty whether to categorize software as sales or as licenses 
in the US seems to have at least been somewhat clarified the last five years. 
2010, in the case of  F.B.T. Productions, LLC, et al. v. Aftermath Records, et 
al., the Ninth Circuit dealt with sales and licensing agreements regarding 
downloadable digital music.
 150
 The rap artist Eminem had signed a record 
contract with F.B.T., which in turn signed an agreement with Aftermath 
Records granting the latter the distribution right in exchange for royalty. 
The royalty fees were calculated according to two provisions, the ‘sold’ 
provision; granting F.B.T. 15-20% in royalty for every full-priced sold 
record, and the ‘master licensed’ provision; granting 50 % in royalty. The 
term ‘master’ was defined as ‘a recording of a sound, without or with visual 
images, which is used or useful in the recording, production or manufacture 
of records’. Aftermath sold digital music files to companies such as iTunes, 
while paying F.B.T. royalties according to the ‘sold’ provision. Hence, 
F.B.T. sued Aftermath and claimed that the digital transfer should be 
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regarded as licensing and not sales.
151
 The court examined the problematic 
question whether third party digital download should be regarded as sales or 
license agreements, and held that digital media should be considered to fall 
under the ‘master licensed’ provision. The court stated that all files provided 
should be regarded as licenses and not sales.
152
 The court examined the 
problematic question whether third party digital download should be 
regarded as sales or license agreements, and held that digital media should 
be considered to fall under the ‘master licensed’ provision. The court stated 
that all files provided to end users were distributed from one ‘master’ copy, 
and these ‘master’ copies were licensed to third parties such as iTunes. 153 
Furthermore, citing the Wall criteria, the court held that the transaction was 
to be regarded as a license and not sale; due to the fact that the transmission 
did not include ownership and that it could be revoked at any time.
154
   
 
5.3.6 Vernor 
 
The same month as the Aftermath case in 2010, the Ninth Circuit ruled in 
the case Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.
155
 Mr Vernor sold second-hand software of 
Autodesk on eBay, which he had bought from office sales. These software 
packages were originally protected by shrink-wrap license agreements, but 
due to their used nature, these were removed. The question was if the 
transmission from Autodesk to its customers could be considered a sale, 
since that would protect the conduct of Verner under the doctrine.
156
 The 
court developed a ‘three-step test’ in order to determine whether someone is 
a software licensee or not. If a copyright owner:  ‘(1) specifies that the user 
is granted a license; (2) significantly restricts the user's ability to transfer the 
software; and (3) imposes notable use restrictions’, then a user would be 
classified as a licensee.
157
 Examining the factual circumstances, the court 
ruled that the transfer between Autodesk and its customers was to be 
regarded as license agreement and not sale. Thus the First Sale doctrine was 
not applicable.
158
  
 
With the Vernor and Aftermath cases, the US courts have acknowledged the 
strong position of the right holders and license agreements. However, what 
is the legal position on transmission of digital files when those have been 
lawfully acquired? In the recent case of ReDigi, the District Court has 
provided an answer. 
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5.3.7 ReDigi 
 
The US District Court Southern District of New York in the case Capitol 
Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc.,
159
examined the fact whether lawfully acquired 
digital music may be resold under the First Sale doctrine. The company 
ReDigi opened a webpage late 2011, which offered its users a service where 
they could resell their pre-used music files purchased from e.g. iTunes. In 
order to sell music through ReDigi, a user was required to download 
ReDigi’s software program called Media Manager, which searched the 
computer to ensure that the user did not keep the music files put for sale. 
Upon detection, the user was prompted to remove the conflicting file, and a 
refusal would result in suspension from ReDigi’s service. After a search, all 
files target for sale were uploaded to ReDigi’s server.160 Capitol received 
notice regarding the conduct of ReDigi and filed for copyright infringement, 
as Capitol did not approve to neither reproduction nor distribution of its 
music. ReDigi in turn replied that its conduct was acceptable under the First 
Sale doctrine.
161
  
 
The District Court held that ReDigi violated the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and distribution granted to Capitol. The reproduction right was 
infringed due to the fact that using digital transmissions created copies 
falling under the notion of reproduction within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act, which were unauthorized. The court held that the transmission from a 
user’s hard drive to ReDigi’s online storage server could not function 
without reproduction, despite ReDigi’s claims of the opposite. The court 
interpreted the text of 106(1) of the US Copyright Act, to include that 
reproduction was at hand when copyrighted works were transferred into a 
new material object.
162
Similar, the court held that the distribution right was 
violated as sales undisputedly were conducted on ReDigi’s website without 
authorization. However, the court contemplated over the possible 
justification of these infringements with regards to the First Sale doctrine.
163
   
 
The court stated initially that the First Sale defense could not be used by 
ReDigi in order to justify an infringement of reproduction rights. 
Furthermore, the doctrine also did not apply to the distribution as, being 
unauthorized reproductions, the files sold on ReDigi were not lawfully made 
within the meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
164
 The court highlighted the fact 
that the digital reproduction made it near impossible to ascertain a user’s 
original file, which could arguably be subject to a first sale, as the copies 
became identical. Also, the court held that the First Sale doctrine only 
applied to tangible items, and since ReDigi distributed intangible digital 
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files, the company could not claim the First Sale defense. However, ReDigi 
claimed that a refusal to apply the First Sale doctrine would extend the 
rights granted by the Copyright Act, which would be against policy.
165
 The 
court quoted the United States Copyright Office which previously had 
denied extension of the First Sale doctrine to distribution of digital goods: 
 
[p]hysical copies of works degrade with time and use, making used copies less 
desirable than new ones. Digital information does not degrade, and can be reproduced 
perfectly on a recipient’s computer. The “used” copy is just as desirable as (in fact, is 
indistinguishable from) a new copy of the same work. Time, space, effort and cost no 
longer act as barriers to the movement of copies, since digital copies can be 
transmitted nearly instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and 
negligible cost. The need to transport physical copies of works, which acts as a natural 
brake on the effect of resales on the copyright owner’s market, no longer exists in the 
realm of digital transmissions. The ability of such “used” copies to compete for 
market share with new copies is thus far greater in the digital world.
166
  
 
Finally, the court asserted the claim of ReDigi that the Court interpretation 
of Section 109(a) would abolish digital goods from the meaning of the 
statute. As the provision still protected a sale conducted by the lawful 
owner, for instance when the file was originally downloaded to a CD, the 
First Sale doctrine was not entirely removed from application in the digital 
world. The court concluded that the First Sale doctrine was not created to 
compete with modern digitalization, and it was upon the Congress to decide 
the fate of the limitations of the First Sale doctrine, not the court.
167
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6. Analysis 
 
6.1 Sale or license? 
 
Since both the FAPL and the UsedSoft cases were delivered by the Grand 
Chamber of the CJEU, it is indeed feasible that these cases will constitute 
the fundamental basis on determining the relationship between IPR and the 
Internal Market in a digital context. Above all, it is clear that the CJEU is 
determined to ensure that technological innovation will not deteriorate the 
freedom of movement of rights by creating territorial restrictions.
168
 
 
One of the main and crucial determinations regarding the applicability of 
copyright exhaustion on digital files is the intersection between ‘sale’ and 
‘licenses’. It is a fundamental concept of a license agreement that the 
ownership is retained by the right holder, and the software industry has 
based the whole business model on this concept.
169
 Granted, the 
enforceability of software license agreements have been contested within 
the Union, especially in contractual relationships between right holders and 
private consumers.
170
 Nevertheless, ownership has traditionally been 
regarded to remain with the right holder.
171
 With the UsedSoft case, the 
CJEU has provided the Community with a brand new interpretation of 
ownership in certain license agreements.
172
 Arguments have been raised that 
the notion of ‘sale’ shall only enshrine software in tangible mediums, since 
transfer of ownership traditionally has only applied to physical 
objects.
173
However, as noted by Król and Menčl, such interpretation cannot 
be accepted, because the sole difference between sale of a tangible medium 
with software and a download is the method of distribution, whereas the 
economic transaction remains the same.
174
The CJEU also highlighted the 
importance of the economical factor, as both it and AG Bot came to the 
same statement that the contractual relationship between the proprietor and 
the purchaser must be examined in order to determine ‘sale’.175 It is clear 
that the key factor of a ‘sale’ must be a transfer of ownership in exchange 
for payment. According to the CJEU and AG Bot, allowing users to 
download a copy and use it for an unlimited time, in return for a fixed sum 
must be classified within the meaning of ‘sale’.176  
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The US solution has evolved from the MAI cases into the latest Vernor 
case.
177
 The specific provisions in a software license agreement will be of 
great importance when determining whether the transmission of the 
software is a license or sale.
178
 Consideration shall be taken to a) the 
definition of the transfer, b) the restriction of further transfer and c) use 
restrictions.
179
 In the US examination, labeling the transfer as a ‘license’ and 
include prohibitions on resale would hence be an indication on a license 
agreement relationship. Acknowledging the strength of the license 
agreement, the US courts have indeed ruled in favor for right holders.
180
  
 
At first, it is not surprising that the software industry has conducted trade 
through license agreements with the additional benefits of exclusive 
rights.
181
 In contrast, the consideration from the CJEU that software could 
be regarded as sales is remarkable indeed for the software distributors. 
There has been disapproving opinions whether perpetual license agreements 
in fact includes transfer of ownership, and that the judgment of the CJEU 
contradicts the traditional legal definition of license agreements.
182
 
However, these opinions are too fixated on traditional licensing, and are 
overlooking the peculiar nature of software. It seems strange that goods sold 
with use for an unlimited time for a fixed sum should still be considered 
‘licensed’, governed by license agreements which might not even be 
enforceable.
183
 For physical goods this would have been rather unthinkable, 
and it is refreshing to see the CJEU formulating a novel and logical 
interpretation, which is more nuanced than the US perspective.  
 
However, the interpretation of the CJEU does not address situations without 
payment. Reading the judgment strictly, if no payment is received, the 
transfer would not be regarded as a sale. Ergo, with that interpretation, a 
right holder which transfers the rights to use the software for unlimited time 
could prevent exhaustion. It is uncertain if such an interpretation would be 
correct, although at least according to Król and Menčl, it would be impossible 
to include transfers without payment within the definition of sale.184 Thus, the 
ex analogia interpretations should be kept at a minimum.  
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6.2 Digital Transmission 
 
6.2.1 Distribution 
 
The next legal dilemma regarding exhaustion of copyright in a digital 
environment is the question of transmission. Should downloading of 
software be classified as ‘distribution’ or ‘reproduction’, and what is the 
relationship to the right of communication to the public?
185
 In the UsedSoft 
case, both Oracle and the Commission argued that having copies available 
for download on a website fell under the notion of ‘making available to the 
public’ in Art. 3(1) of the InfoSoc Directive, which would preclude the 
principle of exhaustion.
186
 As illustrated under 4.3.3, the CJEU rejected 
those arguments based on the lex specialis of the Software Directive. 
However, some concerns have appeared noting the confusion of labeling the 
Software Directive as lex specialis over the InfoSoc.
187
 As illustrated in 
chapter 3.4, there are merely minor differences between the Software 
Directive of 1991 compared to the current version of 2009, and the relevant 
provisions regarding exhaustion are basically equivalent. This means that 
provisions codified 22 years ago, when the majority of software was 
transferred by physical medium, have precedence over the more 
contemporary InfoSoc Directive.
188
 Hence, the opposing opinions of the 
judgment questions why the InfoSoc Directive, with explicit rules on the 
application of exhaustion on online services shall submit to the Software 
Directive with vague provisions on the contested concept of 
exhaustion.
189While it is apparent that the legal ‘clash’ between the 
Software and InfoSoc Directive causes confusion such as the above 
mentioning of lex specialis, it must be remembered that they have different 
origins which could explain the dichotomy.
190
 The problematic intersection 
between the Directives will be addressed below in 6.6.  
 
Furthermore, the court did not examine the term of ‘any form of 
distribution’, as having established the existence of a sale, the principle of 
exhaustion granted in Art. 4(2) Software Directive was applicable. The court 
also held that, stemming from Art. 6(1) WCT, that a sale, which constitutes 
a transfer of ownership, will transform Art. 3 InfoSoc Directive into the 
distribution provision of Art. 4 InfoSoc Directive.
191
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There has been criticism against this interpretation of the CJEU.
192
 In 
previous EU case law, along with the InfoSoc Directive, transfer of 
intangibles has been regarded as a service, although suggested inter alia by 
AG Kokott
193
, on which the principle of exhaustion does not apply.
194
 The 
CJEU has not commented on the question whether transfer of certain 
intangibles, such as e-books and digital music files, should be exempted 
from the service interpretation and instead be classified as distribution of 
goods. Thus, the proprietors have interpreted ‘making available to the 
public’ as a service within the meaning of the WCT.195 Art. 8 WCT grants 
right holders the exclusive right to communicate ‘by wire or wireless 
means’, which cannot be the target of exhaustion.196 Nevertheless, it seems 
that the CJEU does not further assess the nature of the transmission as long 
as the work in question is regarded to be sold. Therefore, as long as the 
software is regarded to be sold, the transmission will be held to be a 
distribution.
197
 However, in the legislative acts the principle of exhaustion is 
expressively stated to be inapplicable to intangible goods. This stance has 
additionally been confirmed by the Commission.
198
  How could the CJEU 
legitimize an extended scope of the principle of exhaustion?  
 
6.2.2 Application of the principle of exhaustion on 
intangible goods 
 
In the UsedSoft case, the CJEU held that the Software Directive makes no 
explicit difference between tangibles and intangibles in Art. 4(2) through the 
term of ‘sale … of a copy of a program’.199 Art. 1(2) and Recital 7 in the 
preamble also safeguarded computer programs in ‘any form’.200 
Furthermore, nothing in the Proposal explicitly prohibits the application of 
exhaustion on intangibles.201 Given the lex specialis mentioned above, the 
Software Directive has precedence over the lex generalis InfoSoc, thus 
enabling the application of the principle of exhaustion. 202 
 
The CJEU did acknowledge that extending exhaustion on intangibles could 
create a dichotomy between the two Directives as the InfoSoc limits the 
exhaustion to tangible goods. However, even so, given the ‘different intention’ 
behind the Software Directive, Art. 4(2) of that Directive should not be affected 
by Recital 28 and 29 in the InfoSoc Directive.203 It is unclear whether the CJEU 
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with this comment aimed to limit the extension of the principle of exhaustion to 
intangible computer programs only.  
 
Additionally, the CJEU interpreted Art. 4(2) in the light of the principle of 
equal treatment, stating that sale of computer programs on tangible media is 
similar to sale of computer programs through downloading.
204
 This follows 
the AG Opinion of Kokott that some intangibles are closer to the definition 
of goods than services.  
 
One argument against the applicability of exhaustion on intangible goods is 
the fact that digital products do not deteriorate, and thus maintain their 
pristine condition.
205
 However, that reasoning is somewhat flawed, as some 
digital goods may deteriorate, albeit in a slightly different form. It must be 
remembered that the technology advancement not only has created legal 
dilemmas for legislators over the world, it also indirectly imposes an 
expiration date upon software. For instance, most of the software marketed 
in the nineties is in fact unusable today, due to; inter alia, inoperability with 
operating systems. Furthermore, regarding the other digital works, it 
depends on how they are coded. For instance, a film delivered in a certain 
code format may be unwatchable if that format, due to its age, is not 
supported by the current media player. Hence, as with physical copies 
requiring the adequate system to function, software, both tangible and 
intangible copies can arguably become outdated.  
 
With that said, it seems that the main reason for the CJEU to dismiss the 
claim inapplicability of exhaustion on intangibles and therefore override the 
InfoSoc Directive, is due to competition law policy.
206
 As AG Bot observed, 
excluding sales of downloading from the principle of exhaustion could give 
rise to an increase of market partitioning and would go beyond the specific 
subject-matter of copyright.
207
Granting exhaustion on intangible computer 
programs will on the other hand be problematic, as it infringes the right of 
reproduction, which will be examined next.  
 
6.2.3 Reproduction 
 
By expanding the principle of exhaustion to downloaded copies of software, 
the concept is in conflict with the exclusive right of an author to reproduce 
his/her work, as copies are created when a transmission occurs in a digital 
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environment.
208
 As identified by the Commission in the Proposal of the 
Software Directive, ensuring the exclusive right of reproduction to authors 
is fundamental to render the protection effective. Without the provision of 
Art. 4(1) Software Directive, there would not be any incentives for creating 
software, as all works could be copied without consequence.
 209
 
 
With that said, scholars have argued that the copyright exhaustion rule 
should include the reproduction right of the author. Otherwise, in order to 
realize a resale of computer programs, the original material medium needs 
to be copied, which would impair software tradability.
210
While a resale of 
downloaded software indeed requires copying to function, a too broad 
interpretation of the principle of exhaustion to include reproduction may be 
contra-productive, since it would threaten the fundamental protection of 
software.
211
   
 
Nevertheless, the CJEU did unfortunately not in the UsedSoft case 
contemplate extensively over possible exhaustion of reproduction, other 
than stating that a copy targeted for resale must be made ‘unusable’. Instead, 
the copies created were the result of the lawful acquirer using the program 
for its intended purpose granted by Art. 5(1) Software Directive.
212
   
 
6.2.4 US perspective 
 
The US courts have focused more on the reproduction than distribution of 
intangible goods. Through the ReDigi case, the District Court of New York 
have made the distinction that the First Sale doctrine only applies to tangible 
assets as it requires a ‘particular’ copy to be transmitted. As digital transmission 
creates copies it cannot fall under the scope of the principle of First Sale, since 
a ‘particular’ copy is not transferred. 213 Hence, digital transmission should 
always be regarded as an act of reproduction in the US, at least until the 
creation of temporary copies can be removed.  
 
6.3 Lawful use 
 
6.3.1 The Original Acquirer 
 
Through the UsedSoft case, the CJEU addressed the dilemma that using 
computer programs inevitably creates copies. As described under chapter 
4.3.3, the court has ruled that purchasing and downloading a computer 
program will create copies that must be regarded as a result of using the 
program for its intended purpose. These can be resold if made ‘unusable’.214   
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The CJEU did apparently not share AG Bots concerns of the detrimental 
effects on the principle of legal certainty by including the right of 
reproduction into the scope of copyright exhaustion.
215
 Nevertheless, it must 
be underlined that the granted right by the CJEU to transfer a downloaded 
copy by reselling it, is not a foolish opening of a Pandora’s Box of unlimited 
copying. An original acquirer must render the software target for resale 
permanent inoperable to him/her in order to benefit from the extended right. 
Thus, practices where the original acquirer maintains the copy as usable and 
resells new copies from it would be regarded as unauthorized copying and 
in breach of the reproduction rights given to a right holder.  
 
Furthermore, by allowing exhaustion of distribution but prohibiting the 
necessary reproduction, the CJEU would have created potential legal 
uncertainty where the software could be sold but not used.
216
The concerns 
of the AG are unfounded if the reasoning above is followed.  
 
US legislation states that the First Sale doctrine does not extend to a user of 
e.g. a licensed copy if that user has not acquired ownership over said 
copy.
217
 Following the Vernor criteria, described in chapter 5.3.6, which 
determined whether a user is a licensee or an owner, it is hard for users to 
claim they are owners of the software given the strength of the license 
agreements.    
 
6.3.2 The Second Acquirer 
 
The CJEU extended Art. 5(1) Software Directive to also include subsequent 
acquirers after the original one within the scope of ‘lawful acquirer’.218 
However, this creates questions regarding the relationship between the right 
holder and a second acquirer. As Harris has pointed out, a purchaser of 
resold software could retrieve it in two ways. The original purchaser could 
send the program to the second acquirer, which would create a situation 
where the new owner is entitled to use the program, but without further 
knowledge regarding the license provisions between the right holder and 
original purchaser. On the other hand, a second acquirer could also 
download the software from the rightholder’s website by purchasing a used 
password. In this case, in connection with the download, the second-hand 
user would be made aware of the EULA through e.g. a click-wrap 
license.
219
Furthermore, if the CJEU would state that the transfer of software 
will include the license, the purchaser of the resold software could be 
imposed terms he/she never agreed to.
220
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However, these concerns are connected with the legal interpretation and 
contested enforceability of EULA’s. In the UK, EULA’s, at least in the form 
of click-wrap agreements, should be regarded as enforceable
221
, which 
explains the concerns of Harris. Software license agreements have been, 
illustrated in chapter 6.1, regarded as sales, but the further intersection of 
contract law in form of licensing agreements has not been examined.  
 
6.4 Licensing Agreements 
 
The judgment of UsedSoft has affected traditional license agreements, as 
clauses preventing transfer of software can no longer be enforced. Otherwise, 
according to the CJEU, the principle of exhaustion could be circumvented.222 
  
Limiting the software license agreement is furthermore protecting the 
consumer. Most purchasers of software know that protective measures such 
as DRM might be in place in order to protect the right holder from online 
piracy, although they would be surprised that the EULA contains 
prohibition on resale. Similar clauses in other copyrighted work, for 
instance a painting, would also be regarded as inapplicable.
223
  
 
Additionally, by regarding software licenses as sales, provisions contained 
in EULA’s, attached to a specific software, confirming that the ownership 
still remains with the right holder will be without purpose if use for an 
unlimited time has been granted in return of a fixed sum.
224
 Clearly, it does 
not matter whether the software license agreement take the form of a shrink-
wrap or click-wrap agreement in an attempt to prevent transfer of 
ownership. By utilizing an e-commerce method of downloadable copies 
with timeless use, a developer has apparently agreed to sell its software 
instead of out-license it.  
 
On the contrary, in the US the position of license agreements has been 
enhanced since the Softman case through several judgments, most notably 
the Vernor and Aftermath cases. This has at the same time raised criticism 
regarding consumer protection in the US.
225
 Nevertheless, with the recent 
ReDigi case, the legal trend does not appear to be derailing on its course to 
strong right holder protection.  
 
It should be noted that maintenance agreements, which are classified as 
services, can be prevented from being transferred. Thus, a second acquirer 
could be excluded from receiving future updates and fixes to the purchased 
software.
226
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A new service agreement must otherwise be formed between the second 
acquirer and the right holder. It is highly unlikely, as Göbel correctly 
observes that the right holder is elated to form such new agreements due to 
the second-hand status of the software. Nevertheless, the potential refusal of 
maintenance agreements to second acquirers may be detrimental to the right 
holder in a longer perspective, as third party undertakings could be offering 
the maintenance instead. Such refusal could also be considered as infringing 
competition law.
 227
 With that said, is unlikely that the UsedSoft case will 
have any major consequences on software that requires constant 
maintenance to function.
228
  
 
6.5 Extended scope of exhaustion to other digital works 
 
It is no doubt that the landmark cases will have an impact on the intangible 
digital mediums which were not the target of the judgments; e-books, music 
files and films/TV-series. Albeit not ‘software’ per se229, the digital 
transmission is commonly the same as with software. Could the extended 
scope of exhaustion apply to these intangible goods?  
 
First of all, it must be noted that much of the reasoning of the CJEU in 
UsedSoft concerned software and the fact that the Software Directive is lex 
specialis in relation to InfoSoc.
230
 As such, it is likely that films, e-books 
and music digitally transferred will not be the target of exhaustion as they 
are governed by the InfoSoc Directive. However, if the criteria launched by 
the CJEU, in order to determine whether a sale or a license is at hand, are 
applied to the digital goods, the result would be identical. Most music files, 
films and e-books are granted with indefinite use to the purchaser in return 
for a fixed payment sum. Ergo, those transfers should be regarded as sales 
equal to software.   
 
Secondly, since the CJEU held that if the transmission was a transfer of 
ownership and thus changing an act of communication into an act of 
distribution
231
, the case of UsedSoft implies that other digital works could 
indeed be the target of the principle of exhaustion.  
 
Thirdly, as argued by AG Kokott, allowing the portioning of the Internal 
Market of digital works would be in conflict with competition law and the 
specific subject-matter of copyright.
232
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However, in contrast to the Software Directive, the InfoSoc Directive does 
not contain an explicit provision on lawful acquirers.
233
Art. 5 InfoSoc 
Directive allows temporary acts of reproduction, but this article is aimed to 
cover only transient copies without economic value, such as the temporary 
copy stored in the RAM of a computer when a user e.g. watches a 
film.
234
Despite the fact that the InfoSoc Directive does not exempt 
permanent copies, there have been suggestions that an act of reproduction 
which only aims to make a resale possible should still be considered legit.
235
  
 
National case law is starting to emerge guided by the judgments of FAPL 
and UsedSoft.
236
The interpretation of paragraph 60 in the UsedSoft case will 
be crucial. Guidelines must be delivered whether it is possible to apply 
copyright exhaustion on all digital works that can be classified as sold, or 
only allow the principle on downloaded software. Also, notice must be 
taken to the development in the US, where exhaustion never will apply to 
digital works, as long as it gives rise to reproduction. The CJEU will 
undoubtedly have to examine the question of the other digital intangibles in 
order to enhance the guidance in this troublesome area.  
 
6.6 Consequences  
 
6.6.1 Copyright legislation 
 
A very important factor of the UsedSoft case is the impact on the InfoSoc 
Directive. As with other Directives, the InfoSoc Directive based its 
legitimacy on Art. 114 TFEU, to pursue the establishment of the Internal 
Market.
237
As scholars have addressed, the restriction by the InfoSoc 
Directive to only allow exhaustion on distribution of physical goods instead 
of giving a solution on how to ‘enforce the principle of the free movement 
of copyrighted goods and services on the Internet’ and thus removing 
barriers on the online market, raises concerns that the Directive has failed its 
constitutional goal.
238
With the UsedSoft judgment, the CJEU seems to 
indirectly confirm the incapability of the InfoSoc Directive to remove online 
market barriers, as the Court extended the principle of copyright exhaustion 
in order to prevent market partitioning of software.  
 
However, other opinions have argued, regardless the potential 
inapplicability of the InfoSoc Directive, that the European Member States 
                                                 
233
Mazziotti (n 29) 88-89. 
234
Case C-5/08 Infopaq v Danske Dagblades Forening (2009) ECR. I-6569 para 54. 
235
Lukas Feiler ‘Birth of the First-Download Doctrine: The Application of the First-Sale 
Doctrine to Internet Downloads under EU and U.S.’ Copyright Law, Stanford-Vienna 
TTLF Working Papers No. 17, 11 http://ttlf.stanford.edu (last visited 23 May 2013). 
236
Case Tempelhofer v CMS Hasche Sigle (in German) 5.3.2013, Az. 4 O 191/11, 
http://www.boersenverein.de/sixcms/media.php/976/LG_Bielefeld_vom_05.03.13_Klag
e_Verbraucherzentralen.pdf  (last visited 23 May 2013) The Landsgericht (District 
Court) held that the principle of exhaustion is not applicable on resold e-books. 
237
Mazziotti (n 29) 49. 
238
ibid 68-69. 
 47 
are now in fact infringing the WCT through the judgment of UsedSoft.
239
 
Art. 8 WCT does not allow exhaustion on the exclusive right to 
communicate a work to the public, ‘[which] covers transmissions of digital 
and digitized works over the internet’240. Furthermore, according to Art. 22, 
Art. 8 cannot be implemented in a way that would alter the contents of the 
WCT. Since the CJEU has interpreted the copyright exhaustion in the 
Software Directive to apply on digital transmission of software, EU law is 
breaching the WCT.
241
 This reasoning depends on the interpretation of the 
digital transmission in question, which has been illustrated above in 6.2.  
 
Which reasoning is the most logical one? It must be held that the 
examination of the economical transaction of the disputed digital work, 
which the CJEU has done, instead of staring blindly at the digital 
transmission, is more reasonable.
 242
Hence, the CJEU will legitimize its 
judgment by following Art. 6(1) WCT instead of Art. 8 WCT. The Agreed 
Statement 6 and 7 in the WCT will not prevent that 
interpretation.
243
Nevertheless, it is clear that the interest of the WCT to 
maintain the exclusive rights of the right holder is in conflict with the aim of 
CJEU to maintain the Internal Market.  
 
6.6.2 Competition aspects 
 
Another interesting aspect of the case UsedSoft is the enhanced definition of 
the specific subject-matter of copyright which follows the FAPL case. As 
that subject-matter is limited to an ‘appropriate’ remuneration by the CJEU, 
there have been raised concerns over the impact of this interpretation on 
proprietors.
244
 If CJEU and national courts were to maintain that all 
compensation for various IPR must be proportionate, several different areas, 
such as pharmaceutical licensing could be affected. Nevertheless, as 
Stothers points out, this would be a too extensive interpretation of the 
judgment, as the CJEU is stating that a proprietor cannot justify an 
enlargement of the scope of his/her exclusive rights granted by copyright by 
referring to the larger profit he/she would receive if the scope was 
enlarged.
245
 That statement cannot be regarded as an outrageous decision 
and the CJEU will undoubtedly adopt a rational stance when applying the 
concept.  
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Furthermore, by stating that a limitation of the principle of exhaustion to 
apply only on tangible products would go ‘beyond what is necessary to 
safeguard the specific subject-matter of IPR’, the CJEU has underlined that 
the prime rationale of exhaustion is to ensure the freedom of movements.
246
  
 
Although a somewhat diffuse concept, aligning the digital industry to be in 
compliance with the goal of creating an Internal Market is reasonable. The 
Commission is not content with the current unharmonized digital market, as 
it is working on the Digital Agenda for Europe, set for completion in 2020, 
and has devoted the first pillar to the construction of a Single Digital 
Market.
247
The following sections will illustrate the consequences for the 
various involved in that industry.   
 
6.6.3 Right holders 
 
The obvious result of the UsedSoft case is that, due to the increase in resold 
licenses, right holders will see a decline of sales. An increase of competition 
from third parties reselling software, will furthermore affect prices 
negatively for the right holder.
248
 As with the parallel trade of 
pharmaceutical it could be argued that allowing second-hand software will 
be detrimental to innovation of copyright, removing the incentives to profit 
from hard labor.
249
 However, it is important to notice that the CJEU did not 
allow partitioning of licenses, through resale of ‘surplus‘, or ‘unused’, user 
licenses. This would have been detrimental to license agreements which 
included multi-user licenses, as no proprietor would out-license software 
which included a larger amount of user licenses, since costumers could then 
resell the surplus licenses and recoup part of the payment.
250
 Such conduct 
would grant the purchaser an unfair advantage of the agreement, and the 
outcome would certainly create barriers for licensing in Europe. Albeit not 
preventing the intact group licensed from being resold, the ruling of the 
CJEU will at least prevent purchasers from reselling redundant licenses in 
order to seek some recoupment of the initial purchase.   
 
Furthermore, the CJEU granted right holders the possibility to employ 
technical protection such as DRM and product keys in order to safeguard 
that the transferred work will not be reproduced illegally.
251
  
 
With that said, there exist several methods for a right holder to limit resale. 
Since the CJEU prohibited split of group licensing, this could be a solution 
for right holders to limit resale by only selling licenses in bundles. Another 
                                                 
246
UsedSoft (n 90) para 63. 
247
The European Commission Digital Agenda For Europe https://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/our-goals/pillar-i-digital-single-market (last visited 23 May 2013). 
248
Göbels (n 216) 228-29. 
249
Anna Rita Bennato and Tommaso Valletti Pharmaceutical Innovation and Parallel 
Trade 12th CEPR/JIE Conference on Applied Industrial Organization 17 May 2011, 30 
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6691/papers/VallettiFinal-P.pdf (last visited 23 May 
2013). 
250
Göbels (n 216) 232. 
251
UsedSoft (n 90) para 79. 
 49 
effective way would be to ensure that a transfer of ownership never takes 
place.
252
 Ergo, by stating that a licensee is entitled to use the software on 
month-by-month-basis in return for a recurring fee, it would be difficult for 
a court to interpret that license as a transfer of ownership. However, it is 
important to underline the fact that the revised license agreements cannot be 
sales in disguise. Hence they need to emphasize on the subscription based 
remuneration system granted for a specific time, but unfortunately, the 
CJEU did not provide examples on acceptable time length.   
 
Another method launched by legal commentators is the transformation of 
software as goods into services, by having the software stored on the right 
holder’s servers which the user needs to access in order to use the 
program.
253
 This ‘cloud computing’ would be interpreted under the scope of 
the InfoSoc Directive instead of the Software Directive. However, this form 
of DRM will require the user to have connection to the Internet constantly, 
which can become disastrous for the reputation of a right holder if the 
connection fail, e.g. by an overload of users.
254
  
 
6.6.4 Resellers 
 
Through the case of UsedSoft, the resellers of software are now performing 
a legal business, and the future status must be deemed as positive indeed. 
Since the CJEU has removed the doubts and confusion whether the practice 
was illegal or not, companies dealing with second-hand software should see 
an increase in costumers. 
  
However, a problematic question remains. In order to make a copy eligible 
for resale, the owner must render it ‘unusable’. While not very troublesome 
from a legal perspective; the owner must extinguish all possibilities to 
access the software after transfer, the technical issue is de facto more 
intriguing.  
 
One method could be the application of the ‘forward and delete’ system, 
which has been suggested in the US. This method will remove the copy 
from a reseller’s computer when transferred. However, this system requires 
extensive coding and management and may prove expensive.
255
  
 
As the CJEU acknowledged, another method could be to inter alia bind the 
copy with a product key which can be transferred. In order to download a 
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copy and use it, a purchaser needs to activate an account with a serial key. 
This key is the actual purchase, and the software can neither be downloaded 
without a legit key nor copied to another computer. These keys should be 
the target of resale.
256
  
 
What happens if the reseller has illicit attentions? In case of the reseller 
being a company such problems would probably not arise, due to the terrible 
impact on the reputation, however, private resellers may take advantage of 
the second-hand software, selling software without functioning keys. 
Nevertheless, this is not within the scope of copyright law to govern, as such 
conduct would be regarded as criminal.  
 
The issue remains whether the current technology can fulfill the 
requirements of the CJEU. The system of serial keys is very interesting and 
the future will tell if such a solution will embrace the resellers.   
 
6.6.5 Consumers 
 
For the EU consumers, the initial reaction should be positive, as the 
judgment of UsedSoft confirms that ‘if you buy it, you own it’. A parallel 
market of used software should lead to better pricing of software as more 
competition will be at hand.
257
 Additionally, several companies can recoup 
the cost of expensive business software by reselling it when no longer used. 
This can be very valuable inter alia in insolvency situations, where reselling 
software could help a liquidator secure more money to the creditors.   
 
Whereas the concern of the CJEU over consumer protection is strong in the 
EU, the US counterparts apparently value the protection of right holders 
more, which the recent case law development illustrates. Several scholars 
are calling for the Congress to provide a legislative solution.
258
The future 
will tell if the Congress accepts the challenge.  
 
Finally, as illustrated in 6.6.3, since the CJEU granted right holders to use 
technical measures in order to make copies unusable before sale, the result 
could be that more right holders will use DRM, which could result in a conflict 
of the right of free use. Moving software into cloud computing in order to 
transform them from goods into services can result in frustrating problems 
when the users cannot connect to the servers, e.g. to failed Internet 
connection.259 
 
6.7 US ‘nay’ or EU ‘yay’?  
 
Comparing the EU and US case law regarding digital exhaustion, it is 
apparent that a discrepancy has been created when the legal system are 
moving towards two opposite interpretations of the potential applicability of 
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exhaustion. The CJEU has continued on the road to remove obstacles from 
the free movement of goods and services in a digital environment, initiated 
in the FAPL case. The legal development in the US on the other hand has 
gone from legal disarray regarding the application of exhaustion of rights, 
the First Sale doctrine, on software licenses and digital goods, to a unified 
stance. Recent case law have determined that the First Sale doctrine do not 
apply in a digital context 
 
Regarding the ‘sale or license’ definition, it must be noted that in essence, 
the US courts and CJEU are examining the same thing; the transfer of 
ownership. However, the US courts put great emphasis on the specific 
provisions in a license agreement. While license agreements generally are 
good methods to promote innovation and to protect a right holder, enforcing 
EULA’s is not a satisfactory solution. Indeed, shrink-wrap or click-wrap 
licenses, which most EULA’s consist of, include an ‘acceptance’260 from a 
user to agree to the terms within. Nevertheless, the US courts should 
examine the contractual relationship in a similar way as the CJEU, because 
many software licenses should be closer to be regarded as sold rather than 
licensed.   
 
Furthermore, the US refusal to apply the principle of exhaustion on digital 
transmissions in ReDigi, because it will result in the creation of 
unauthorized copies, cannot be compared totally adequate with the UsedSoft 
case, since ReDigi revolves around digital music files and not software as in 
UsedSoft.
261
 It is possible the CJEU would have come to the same 
conclusion as the US District Court regarding digital music. The CJEU will 
certainly address other digital works in the near future. 
 
With that said, although some questions remain, the European stance is 
more preferable than the US, as long as the licenses in question are transfers 
of ownership and therefore are actually sold. The reason for this statement is 
that right holders cannot safely hide anymore behind license agreements and 
monopolistic software distribution when they are actually in fact selling 
goods, not services.   
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7. Conclusion 
 
The concept of exhaustion of right through first sale has emerged from case 
law in both the EU and the US. By limiting a right holder’s exclusive right 
when he/she puts goods with consent up for sale, the jurisdictions have tried 
to maintain a balanced market. The CJEU method of examining licenses is 
an adequate tool to classify them as sold or not. Most software licenses 
should be considered sold when a transfer of ownership has been stated. 
Leaving a product with granted use for an unlimited time in the possession 
of a consumer, in return for a lump sum, is similar to sale of physical goods, 
with the intangible nature as the only major difference. When a ‘license’ 
have all the characteristics of a sale, why should it not be counted as one? 
The right holders of software have enjoyed their exclusivity, but as the 
CJEU has found; it is time to make them subjects to the Internal Market. 
 
With the judgment of UsedSoft, the CJEU seems to have provided the 
Community with a solution regarding the delicate matter of exhaustion of 
rights and intangible goods. Software stored upon physical medium, for 
instance a CD, have been accepted to fall under the principle of exhaustion, 
but intangible software has been regarded as outside the scope, due to literal 
interpretation of applicable legislation. Digital transmission as a service, or 
as a communication to the public, should apply to those circumstances were 
streaming is at hand, consequently, when the transmitted work is played 
directly in the user’s computer. On the other hand, when a copy is 
transferred as a file, irrespectively if it is a computer game, music or e-book, 
this should be labeled as a distribution. Instead of modernizing the concept 
of exhaustion as the CJEU did in UsedSoft, US courts have maintained that 
the principle is a creation of tangible transfers and should remain limited to 
such transmissions. Since software correctly have been regarded as sold by 
the CJEU, and thus distributed, it would have been strange to limit the 
principle of exhaustion to tangible transmission only.    
 
While making the practice of reselling computer software legal, the CJEU 
has yet to decide whether the reasoning of UsedSoft can be extended to 
include other digital works such as music and e-books. However, it would 
be strange of the CJEU to exclude those works. Is there really a clear 
difference between computer programs and other similar digital works, if 
the ‘sale/license’-test launched by the CJEU is performed?  
 
Furthermore, it is apparent that, in its current form, the InfoSoc Directive is 
struggling with the concept of a Digital Single Market and requires to be 
altered. The EU needs to decide whether it shall follow the more right 
holder-friendly solution adopted by the US or ascertain that the Internal 
Market has precedence. 
 
The commercial implications of the UsedSoft case are that the market for 
second hand software is likely to expand rapidly. The software industry is 
faced with the challenge to comply with the standings of the CJEU, and it 
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will be very interesting to see which solution will be constructed. As right 
holders were given permission by the CJEU to use technical features in 
order to ascertain that a copy will be rendered unusable when resold, it is 
very likely that anti-circumvention technologies, such as DRM, will 
increase in use. However, right holders must carefully consider the chosen 
solution, as implementing an inadequate method may risk violating 
consumer protection and distorting competition. For instance, allowing all 
right holders to transform their software from goods into services by using 
cloud computing will remove every possibility to resell software. On the 
other hand, the suggestion to bind all sales of software with a serial key is 
an adequate solution that merely needs time to be developed and perfected. 
It remains to see which methods are regarded as acceptable by the CJEU. 
 
Although the EU must await additional legal cases in order to clarify the 
remaining issues, it will be interesting to follow the application of the 
extended copyright exhaustion, which, after the case of UsedSoft now also 
entails reproduction to some extent. It is very likely that in the near future, 
purchasing second-hand Word on a website will not be more remarkable 
than purchasing a pair of second-hand Nike shoes in a physical store. The 
reign of monopolistic software licensing is over. 
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Supplement A 
 
 
Software Directive 
 
Article 4 states that: 
 
1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 5 and 6, the exclusive rights of the 
rightholder within the meaning of Article 2 shall include the right to do 
or to authorize: 
 
a. the permanent or temporary reproduction of a computer by 
any means and in any form, in part or in whole; in so far as 
loading, displaying, running, transmission or storage of the 
computer program necessitate such reproduction, such acts 
shall be subject to authorization by the rightholder; 
b. the translation, adaption, arrangement and any other 
alteration of a computer program and the reproduction of the 
results thereof, without prejudice to the rights of the person 
who alters the program; 
c. any form of distribution to the public, including the rental, of 
the original computer program or of copies thereof. 
 
2. The first sale in the Community of a copy of a program by the right 
holder or with his consent shall exhaust the distribution right within the 
Community of that copy, with the exception of the right to control 
further rental of the program or a copy thereof. 
 
InfoSoc Directive 
 
Article 3 states: 
 
Right of communication to the public of works and right of making 
available to the public other subject-matter 
1. Member States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to 
authorise or prohibit any communication to the public of their works, 
by wire or wireless means, including the making available to the public 
of their works in such a way that members of the public may access 
them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them. 
2. Member States shall provide for the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit the making available to the public, by wire or wireless means, 
in such a way that members of the public may access them from a place 
and at a time individually chosen by them: 
(a) for performers, of fixations of their performances; 
(b)  for phonogram producers, of their phonograms; 
(c) for the producers of the first fixations of films, of the original and 
copies of their films; 
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(d) for broadcasting organisations, of fixations of their broadcasts, 
whether these broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, 
including by cable or satellite. 
3. The rights referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not be exhausted by 
any act of communication to the public or making available to the 
public as set out in this Article. 
 
Whereas Article 4 states:  
 
Distribution right 
 
1. Member States shall provide for authors, in respect of the original of   
their works or of copies thereof, the exclusive right to authorise or 
prohibit any form of distribution to the public by sale or otherwise. 
2. The distribution right shall not be exhausted within the Community in 
respect of the original or copies of the work, except where the first sale 
or other transfer of ownership in the Community of that object is made 
by the rightholder or with his consent. 
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